At War with the Eclectics: Mapping Pragmatism in Contemporary Legal Analysis by Desautels-Stein, Justin
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship 
2007 
At War with the Eclectics: Mapping Pragmatism in Contemporary 
Legal Analysis 
Justin Desautels-Stein 
University of Colorado Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles 
 Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the Law and Philosophy 
Commons 
Citation Information 
Justin Desautels-Stein, At War with the Eclectics: Mapping Pragmatism in Contemporary Legal Analysis, 
2007 Mich. St. L. Rev. 565, available at http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/323/. 
Copyright Statement 
Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and 
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is 
required. 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact jane.thompson@colorado.edu. 
Citation: 2007 Mich. St. L. Rev. 565 2007 
Provided by: 
William A. Wise Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Mon Mar 27 18:50:32 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
AT WAR WITH THE ECLECTICS:
MAPPING PRAGMATISM IN CONTEMPORARY
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Justin Desautels-Stein*
2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 565
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A BSTRA CT .................................................................................................. 566
I. INTRODUCTION: THE GOOD, THE RIGHT, AND THE PRAGMATIST ....... 566
II. FIGHTING FOR FOUNDATIONS: CONSEQUENTIALISTS VERSUS
PRA GM ATISTS ...................................................................................... 576
III. MAPPING LEGAL PRAGMATISM ........................................................... 586
A. From Subversion to Complacency: Legal Realism and Legal
Pragm atism .................................................................................. 586
B . The Players .................................................................................. 589
1. The Eclectic Pragmatist ........................................................ 590
2. The Economic Pragmatist ..................................................... 595
a. Pragmatic Adjudication .................................................. 596
b. Efficiency and W elfare ................................................... 599
c. Rational Choice: A Theory of the Good ......................... 605
3. The Experimental Pragmatist ............................................... 611
a. Ungerian Experimentalism ............................................. 614
b. The Experimental Method in Legal Reasoning .............. 617
IV . C ONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................... 622
A. Pragmatism? What Pragmatism? ........................... . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . . . .. . 622
B. Pragmatism and Formalism, Together Again, and Again ........ 624
C. Pragmatism : W hat's the Use? .............................. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . 625
D. Against the Cold and the Clammy ............................................... 627
* Associate, Latham & Watkins LLP; LL.M., Harvard Law School (2006); J.D.,
UNC-Chapel Hill School of Law (2005); M.A.L.D., The Fletcher School, Tufts University
(2004). I received helpful comments from Paulo Daflon Barrozo, Adrienne Davis, Janet
Halley, Duncan Kennedy, Fernanda Nicola, Hengameh Saberi, and Amartya Sen. Special
thanks go to David Kennedy and Gerald Postema.
Michigan State Law Review
ABSTRACT
This Article has two primary goals. The first is descriptive and seeks
to respond to what appears to be an increasing degree of confusion over the
word "pragmatism," especially as it is used in a good deal of legal literature.
This descriptive aim begins by separating out three general categories of
pragmatism: (1) the so-called "everyday" pragmatism familiar to the
American vernacular, (2) the classical philosophy of the early pragmatist
authors like William James and John Dewey, and (3) pragmatism as under-
stood in the context of law. The majority of the Article is subsequently con-
cerned with exploring this last category, and in so doing, identifies three
major camps of legal pragmatists: (1) eclectics, as represented by Thomas
Grey and Daniel Farber, (2) economists, as represented by Richard Posner,
and (3) experimentalists, as represented by William Simon, Charles Sabel,
and Michael Dorf. With map in hand, it is hoped that instead of clamoring
to the call of legal pragmatism, legal academics and practitioners will take
greater caution in their embrace of the pragmatist method. This hope
grounds the second and more normative goal of the Article, and that is to
make some trouble for legal pragmatism by not only pointing to its sectari-
anism, but also by querying its usefulness. Two of the lesser critiques ini-
tially target the wholesale lack of predictive power latent in the eclectic
approach, and the counter-intuitive relationship between eclecticism and
neo-formalism. The thrust of the primary criticism is that legal pragmatism,
in each of its manifestations, tends to either mask or simply murder the
promise of an enriched and empowered philosophical pragmatism. As a
consequence, the philosophical muscle latent in the pragmatist method is
lost on the law, barring access to a truly "pragmatist" moment of legal deci-
sion.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE GOOD, THE RIGHT, AND THE PRAGMATIST
The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study of history. His-
tory must be a part of the study, because without it we cannot know the pre-
cise scope of rules which it is our business to know. It is a part of the ra-
tional study, because it is the first step toward an enlightened scepticism,
that is, towards a deliberate reconsideration of the worth of those rules.
When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the daylight,
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you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength. But to
get him out is only the first step. The next is either to kill him, or to tame
him and make him a useful animal.
-- Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'
It would be an interesting exercise to identify among legal academics
the number of active-duty dragon-wranglers working in the profession to-
day. For Holmes, in this very well-known passage, history appears as an
obligatory part of doing legal study. Without such historical context, so the
argument goes, we lack the means for eliminating doctrines long gone sour,
or for bettering those forgotten ideas deserving of a second wind. Historical
study of the law, as a consequence, need not be viewed either as the tool of
critique or apology, but as simply a way of making relevant our received
understandings. Though Holmes' view is not exactly a controversial one
today, it was a clear attack on what was at the end of the nineteenth century
a dominant mode of legal analysis-a mode which harbored little love for
historical context.
2
Due to the extraordinarily rich source of ideas extant in Holmes' writ-
ings, he now stands as godfather to a great deal of the people who, in the
course of the twentieth century, developed variously contradictory ap-
proaches to legal thought in the United States. Thus, sociological jurispru-
dence, legal realism, legal process, law and society, law and economics,
critical legal studies, and legal pragmatism can, in one way or another, find
some part of their project in Holmes and his realism/positivism/pragma-
tism.3
Duncan Kennedy has traced these developments, in effect bringing out
the dragon of American legal thought so better to count its claws and teeth.'
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469
(1897).
2. For discussion on Holmes' critique of Christopher Columbus Langdell, as well
as Langdell's perspective on the use of history in legal analysis, see Patrick J. Kelly, Holmes,
Langdell, and Formalism, 15 RATIO JuRis 26 (2002).
3. For a chronological anthology, see THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
(David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III eds., 2006). Representative writings from these
various categories would include HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Busi-
ness: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudi-
cation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976).
4. This has been an extensive project. For illustrative works, see Duncan Kennedy,
The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. R.Ev. 205 (1979); Duncan Ken-
nedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Considera-
tion and Form ", 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94 (2000).
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In quick schematic form, the dragon looks something like this.5 In the nine-
teenth century a mode of legal analysis, or legal consciousness, called Clas-
sical Legal Thought (CLT) reigned supreme in Europe, and by way of ex-
port, in the United States as well.6 CLT's central ideas included the strict
division of separate spheres of activity for public and private actors (with
the autonomy of the private sphere being the more important of the two), an
emphasis on individualism, and a scientific approach to legal reasoning that
imagined formal concepts susceptible, through logical deduction, to the full
elaboration of legal doctrines.7 It was this set of ideas with which Holmes
began his criticisms, thus launching what Kennedy has called the "social"
phase of legal consciousness This social perspective constructed itself in
opposition to CLT. Thus, where CLT emphasized individualism, social
thought focused on social and institutional needs and demands; where CLT
talked of private autonomy, social thought argued for the politicization of
property and contract law; where CLT believed in formalism and logical
deduction as a mode of legal reasoning, social thought countered with an
instrumental orientation towards law as a means to social ends.9 Kennedy
goes on to argue that somewhere in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a third
legal consciousness took the helm in the American legal profession.'I
In contrast to the dialectical relationship between the first thesis in
CLT and its antithesis formed in social thought, this third phase, in which
we now live, does not represent a synthesis." Instead, contemporary legal
5. This account comes from Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and
Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
6. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE & FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT
(1998). Representative authors include FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF
OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE (Abraham Hayward trans., 1831) (photo.
reprint 1975); FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM OF THE MODERN ROMAN LAW (Wil-
liam Holloway trans., 1839) (photo. reprint 1867); JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON
JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW (Robert Campbell ed., 3d ed. 1869).
7. See sources cited supra note 6.
8. Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law & Legal Thought: 1850-1968, 36
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 631, 633 (2003) [hereinafter Kennedy, Two Globalizations].
9. Id.
10. Id. at 634.
11. This dialectical scheme draws largely on the conceptual tools first developed by
Hegel and Marx. See Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Critique, 22 CARDOzO L. REV. 1147,
1156 (2001). Karl Klare has called this mishmash of the first two modes of legal conscious-
ness "social conceptualism." Karl Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and
the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 280 (1978).
Klare writes:
The resultant, hybrid style of legal reasoning was more attentive to social and po-
litical realities and more self-conscious and candid about the political character of
adjudication than its conceptualist predecessor. But like the latter, it was premised
on the notion that a disjunction between law and politics is necessary to legitimate
[Vol. 2007:565
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thought is characterized by the undigested materials found in both CLT and
social thought, where *the contradictory perspectives and rhetoric of indi-
vidualism and society, formalism and anti-formalism, rights-talk and conse-
quentialism, all remain readily available to the judge, lawyer, law professor,
and student. 2 Indeed, the sign of the times appears to be an eclecticism that
nods its head in approval at the ecumenical state of contemporary legal
thought.
When the critiques of social thought began to gain steam in the rise of
the various "law and-" movements mentioned above, 3 it seems fair to say
that the dominant state of affairs became one in which it was not necessarily
best to find yourself aligned with any one of these schools, but rather with
something. more functional, more pragmatic. 4 That is, contemporary legal
consciousness now seems to suggest that the best judge, lawyer, professor,
whoever, is the one that can intelligently and persuasively wield any argu-
ment that -suits the context. If that means an economic argument makes best
sense in a contracts or antitrust case, so be it. If it means that critical theory
is best used for uncovering a particular ideological sub-text, great. If it
means arguing in the language of human rights and liberal constitutional-
ism, that is fine, too. 'The zeitgeist, in sum, looks to best be captured by an
interest in balancing any number of conflicting approaches with a view of
securing an end with the best effects.
In this Article, I will be arguing that this contemporary posture is a
form of pragmatism. In so doing, it is "pragmatism" itself to be brought
from the cave, and as it turns out, there are a good many more teeth and
the judicial role, and it sought in the reasoned elaboration of neutral principles a
method for upholding the law/politics distinction.
Id.
12. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME?
121 (1996).! As Unger explains; the indeterminacy thesis took legal realists places they had
no intention of ever going. Far from wishing to assert that it was impossible to convey ob-
jective meaning within legal, discourse, Unger suggests that the true intent-was to instead
challenge the ideological assumptions upon which such conveyances are based:
The thesis of radical indeterminacy turns out to -be in large part a metaphor for
something else: a planned campaign of social and cultural criticism. The trouble is
that it does nothing to equip for this campaign or to illuminate its aims. It is a
dead-end. It tempts the radical indeterminist into an intellectual and political de-
sert, and abandons him there alone, disoriented, disarmed, and, at last, corrupted -
by powerlessness.
Id. at 121.
13. See, e.g., Edward L.. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law, 1997 Wis. L.
REv. 521 (1997).
14. The sense that this point-of view is dominant, though relatively unspoken, might
be identified in the Harvard Law Review's choice to have Richard Posner write the foreword
in a recent Supreme Court issue. His argument is that the Court is inevitably "political," and
should understand itself in more pragmatic terms. Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political
Court, 119 HARv. L. REv. 31, 34 (2006).
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claws than one might have at first expected. As many writers have ex-
plained, pragmatism got its legs in the birth of social thought at the end of
the nineteenth century, but varieties of the view continued into the contem-
porary period. 5 One aim in this Article is to bring a much-needed clarity to
our discussions of these pragmatist origins and, more recently, the devel-
opment of a school called legal pragmatism. This goal is consequently a
descriptive one in which it is hoped that by shedding more light on the con-
cept of pragmatism, the interpretive possibilities for the reader rapidly in-
crease, perhaps uncomfortably so. (After all, if parsimony might be a vir-
tue, the map of legal pragmatism finds it lacking.) A necessary risk here is
that, upon finding pragmatism to mean so many things all at the same time,
it might not mean anything at all. There is also a modest normative stake in
the Article, and it concerns the set of promises legal pragmatism typically
seeks to realize, yet almost invariably fails to affirm. As will be discussed
below, this rather complicated issue turns on the philosophical stance of any
given strand of legal pragmatism and, moreover, the rather bland results a
pragmatist stance tends to admit.
Before heading any further, it will be useful to offer a preliminary
sketch of the different uses of "pragmatism" at work in the lexicon today.16
For present purposes, this will involve three general categories of pragma-
tism--"everyday," philosophical, and legal. 7 As for legal pragmatism, I
break the category into another set of three strains-eclectic, economic, and
experimental.
It is easy enough to imagine examples of the first general category of
everyday pragmatism, or what might be called in the vernacular "pragmatic
decision-making.""8 A popular and controversial one is the decision of the
United States government to invade Iraq in early 2003. The relevant ques-
tion for the Bush administration did not appear to be whether international
"rules" allowed for territorial engagement; the focus was instead on the con-
sequences that might come from not acting. 9 Worried that weapons of
15. Kennedy, Two Globalizations, supra note 8, at 677. David Kennedy, The "Rule
of Law," Political Choices, and Development Common Sense, in THE NEW LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT: A CRTICAL APPRAISAL 95 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006);
MIcHAL ALBERSTEIN, PRAGMATISM AND LAW: FROM PHILOSOPHY TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(2002).
16. For a discussion, see Tom Rockmore, On Classical and Neo-Analytical Forms
of Pragmatism, 36 METAPHILOSOPHY 259 (2005).
17. The term "everyday pragmatism" comes from Richard Posner. RICHARD A.
POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 4 (2003).
18. In the discussion that follows, the reader should not make the mistake of assum-
ing that my description of a decision as "pragmatic" in any way suggests an approval of that
decision.
19. Nathaniel Berman provides an interesting analysis of the Bush administration's
anti-authoritarian attitude with respect to the relevance of international rules. For Berman,
the Bush administration felt itselfjustified precisely in the fact that where the United Nations
[Vol. 2007:565
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mass destruction were in the offing, the question was, therefore, one of how
and when to prevent another horror from taking place on American soil.
While many have disagreed with the decision to invade Iraq, it was a typi-
cally "pragmatic" decision in that it used as its handle an emphasis on con-
sequences and an attention to what would "work." In this case, and as this
view would have it, military intervention was going to work where diplo-
macy had failed." Another example of pragmatic decision-making is one
touted by Judge Richard Posner, taken by the United States Supreme Court
during the election crisis in 2000. Despite the questionable legal basis for
the decision in Bush v. Gore,2 Posner has argued, the decision was a good
one because of its pragmatic basis.22 The decision, not based on formal le-
gal reasoning deducted from state election law rules or traditional federal-
ism jurisprudence, favored a result that was concerned first with its conse-
quences. Here, the consequences of prolonging a national crisis where the
fate of the presidency hung in the balance might prove too much for the
public. The pragmatic move, said Posner, was to end the affair, and
quickly.23 An example of pragmatic decision-making a little closer to home
might involve the choice a Christian could face when deciding on a church
to join. Rather than deciding on a denominational basis, say the choice in-
stead turns on the joy and solace the believer feels he will gain by joining
the church with the most charismatic minister and like-minded congrega-
tion. Indeed, if the believer feels that in the future another church better
suits his preferences, he will pragmatically move along, despite worries
about denominational or sectarian allegiance.
This style of pragmatic decision-making has become a substantial as-
pect of a contemporary mainstream Americanism-in its policies, and
sometimes, in its morality. Indeed, few characteristics personify the spirit
was tripped up by its own rules, the United States would find legitimacy in the antinomian
invasion. Berman quotes Bush: "[S]ome permanent members of the Security Council have
publicly announced they will veto any resolution that compels the disarmament of Iraq.
These governments share our assessment of the danger but not our resolve to meet it." Na-
thaniel Berman, Legitimacy through Defiance: From Goa to Iraq, 23 Wis. INT'L L.J. 93, 109
(2005). Curiously, if Berman is right, this might actually prove that the war is not an exam-
ple of everyday pragmatism. Antinomianism may in fact presuppose a latent positivism, and
if this is so, it is not pragmatic, in any sense.
20. A White House background paper illustratively describes this position. WHITE
HOUSE, A DECADE OF DECEPTION AND DEFIANCE: SADDAM HUSSEIN'S DEFIANCE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS (Sept. 12, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002-
/09/iraqdecade.pdf.
21. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
22. RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001); see also A BADLY FLAWED ELECTION: DEBATING
BUSH v. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Ronald Dworkin ed.,
2002).
23. POSNER, supra note 22.
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of American exceptionalism as succinctly as this "everyday" pragmatist
style.24 This is evident enough in the rhetoric of officials from both sides of
the aisle, touting their abilities to pragmatically cut through the red tape,
partisan bickering, or whatever other perfunctory obstacles remain in the
way. To call someone pragmatic in this way is probably something close to
a compliment, and possibly it is also to call them a good American.
Despite the appeal of this common-sense, action-oriented approach,
however, everyday pragmatism looks, upon reflection, a little suspicious.
The pragmatism at work in the types of decisions cited above eclectically
takes its cues from little more than a stripped down consequentialism.2 We
know effects are important, but when it comes to deciding 'whether some-
thing has a good or bad effect, to what does the decision-maker turn? What
is the measure of what counts as having "worked" in an assessment of the
efficacy of military over diplomatic deployments in the case of Iraq, judicial
termination of the presidential controversy over electoral resolution in Bush
v. Gore, or consequentialist determinations of religious affiliation over doc-
trinal or theological alignments in the Christian-congregation scenario? Is it
the case, therefore, that the pragmatist style simply begs the question, offer-
ing up functional solutions that typically leave unearthed the value judg-
ments that support them? Is it not plausible, for example, that a decision to
have let the diplomatic process run its course in Iraq could have been
equally pragmatic for its attention to long-term consequences for terrorism?
If the pragmatic style-the style that likes to emphasize impacts and re-
sults-can be turned around so easily, is pragmatism really a sham?
The answer is "not necessarily," and the reason is that where this eve-
ryday pragmatism appears to fail, its philosophical parent-the second gen-
eral category of pragmatism-may be able to succeed. As elaborated be-
low, philosophical pragmatism as developed by writers like Charles Sanders
Peirce, William James, and John Dewey,26 takes a view on truth, meaning,
and knowledge that is contextual, instrumental, and empirical, yet also falli-
bilistic and anti-skeptical.27 In gross over-simplification, these factors sug-
gest that the classic. pragmatists were very interested in showing -how (1)
24. See, e.g., BRIAN LLOYD, LEFT OUT: PRAGMATISM, EXCEPTIONALISM, AND THE
POVERTY OF AMERICAN MARXISM, 1890-1922 (1997); James T. Kloppenberg, Pragmatism
and the Practice of History: From Turner and Du Bois to Today, 35 METAPHILOSOPHY 202
(2004); CLASSICAL AMERICAN PRAGMATISM: ITS CONTEMPORARY VITALITY (Sandra B.
Rosenthal et al. eds., 1999); ALBERSTEIN, supra note 15, at 1 ("[P]ragmatism is described in
this chapter as having a central role in the constitution of the American subject.").
25. See infra Parts II-III.
26. For a history, see Louis MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2001). For collec-
tions of the classic texts, see PRAGMATISM (Alan R. Malachowski ed., 2004) [hereinafter
PRAGMATISM 2004]; PRAGMATISM: A READER (Louis Menand ed., 1997) [hereinafter
PRAGMATISM 1997].
27. See infra text accompanying notes 52-82.
[Vol. 2007:565
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"truth" was best understood as a compliment one group of people have at-
tributed at one particular historical moment to a concept due to that con-
cept's high cash-value; (2) the domain of "means" should be lauded and
loved while the realm of "ends" should largely be discarded; (3) the powers
of the scientific method could be usefully applied to questions of ethics and
morality; (4) human beings are inevitably committed to provisional, and not
conclusive, epistemological projects due to an inherent penchant for getting
things wrong, at least some of the time; and (5) the fact that despite our in-
capacity to ever know what is really "true" or "good" in the world, we can
never let this fact disrupt the way in which we would ordinarily live in the
world. Even with our eyes closed, the show must nevertheless go on.
The ascendance of philosophical pragmatism did not, however, come
at the time of these classic writers; as a philosophy, it went into hiding after
World War II and the emergence of analytic philosophy. 8 It would be re-
vived in the 1970s in what is often called the "neo-pragmatist" movement,
led by scholars like Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam, who in different re-
spects incorporated into the classic conception the existential and hermeneu-
tic work of philosophers such as W.V.O. Quine, Wilfrid Sellars, Thomas
Kuhn, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Friedrich Nietzche, and Martin Heidegger."9
The force of the reawakening was not of the "everyday" kind, however, and
again was concerned with typically "philosophical" questions of epistemol-
ogy, language, historicism, and foundations for truth and meaning.0 Every-
day pragmatism-the focus on action and "what works"-proceeded in
American culture and government, oblivious of its philosophical counter-
part.
28. See Richard J. Bernstein, John Dewey and the Pragmatic Century, in DEWEY,
PRAGMATISM, AND ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY 27 (Elias L. Khalil ed., 2001).
29.. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979) [hereinafter
RORTY, MIRROR]; RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982) [hereinafter
RORTY, CONSEQUENCES]; RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989)
[hereinafter RORTY, CONTINGENCY]; HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE
DICHOTOMY AND OTHER ESSAYS (2002) [hereinafter PUTNAM, DICHOTOMY]; HILARY
PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH, AND HISTORY (1981). For influential writings, see W.V. Quine,
Two Dogmas of Empiricism, 60 PHIL. REV. 20 (1951); THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970); FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE, THUS SPOKE
ZARATHUSTRA (Walter Kaufmann trans., Random House, Inc. 1995) (1891); MARTIN
HEIDEGGER, ON TIME AND BEING (Joan Stambaugh trans., Univ. Chi. Press 2002) (1927).
30. For representatively general treatments, see THE RANGE OF PRAGMATISM AND
THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (Richard Shusterman ed., 2004); THE PRAGMATIC TURN IN
PHILOSOPHY: CONTEMPORARY ENGAGEMENTS BETWEEN ANALYTIC AND CONTINENTAL
THOUGHT (William Eggington & Mike Sandbothe eds., 2004); PRAGMATISM, CRITIQUE,
JUDGMENT: ESSAYS FOR RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN (Seyla Benhabib & Nancy Fraser eds., 2004);
CLASSICAL AMERICAN PRAGMATISM: ITS CONTEMPORARY VITALITY (Sandra B. Rosenthal et
al. eds., 1999); JOHN P. MURPHY, PRAGMATISM: FROM PEIRCE TO DAVIDSON (1990).
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A third variety of pragmatism (other than the everyday vernacular and
philosophical types), which performs as the primary subject of this Article,
is pragmatism as understood in the context of law.31 Despite the promi-
nence of pragmatism elsewhere in the lexicon, pragmatic decision-making
has enjoyed a strange and rather obscure career in American legal thought.32
On the one hand, there was the strong relationship between innovative legal
thinking in the social critique of CLT and the classic pragmatist philoso-
phers.33 Explicitly influenced by each other, people like Holmes and Dewey
were crafting approaches in their respective fields that tended towards the
basic ideas of historical study and instrumentalism. Holmes' work, how-
ever, did not go on to produce anything like a thing called legal pragmatism
as we know it today. Rather, sociological jurisprudence and legal realism
were the direct heirs, with a considerably different politics than that hosted
by the various legal pragmatisms. What appears to have happened instead,
after WWII and the ascendance of the legal process school, was the import
of everyday pragmatism into the machinery of legal reasoning.34 The poten-
tially explosive and subversive aspects of pragmatism, clear in Dewey's
work and inchoate in the writings of Holmes, were gone.
As the phase of social thought came to an end in the 1960s and 1970s,
however, the proliferation of "law and something" movements helped en-
gender a new space for contemporary forms of legal pragmatism. In con-
trast to the Deweyan themes present in legal realism and the everyday
pragmatism at work in the latter days of legal process, the new legal prag-
matisms became self-conscious: these schools actually used the word
"pragmatism" as a way of distinguishing their approaches from rival
schools of thought. In contemporary legal consciousness, there now ap-
31. For general discussions of pragmatism and law, see DENIS J. BRION,
PRAGMATISM AND JUDICIAL CHOICE (2003); DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 125-78
(1994); Brian Z. Tamanaha, Pragmatism in U.S. Legal Theory: Its Application to Normative
Jurisprudence, Sociolegal Studies, and the Fact-Value Distinction, 41 AM. J. JuRIs. 315
(1996); Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409 (1990);
PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991); Christo-
pher Kutz, Pragmatism Regained, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1639 (2002); Daniel C.K. Chow, A
Pragmatic Model of Law, 67 WASH. L. REV. 755 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990).
32. For a fascinating account of a non-linear picture of these developments, see
ALBERSTEIN, supra note 15, at 1-99.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 89-110.
34. As Alberstein explains, pragmatism has lost much of its philosophical luster
because of this point:
This decline does not prevent pragmatism from functioning as a common-sense
text .... The emergence and dominance of the Legal Process school also can be
explained by the pragmatic mode of children who were brought up on these ideas,
and upon the common-sense level that pragmatism has reached until then.
ALBERSTEIN, supra note 15, at 36.
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pears to be three central categories of legal pragmatism, the discussion of
which forms the majority of this Article.
One question that might flow from this typology is why pragmatism in
law seems so obscure, whereas pragmatism in the vernacular, and to a lesser
extent philosophical pragmatism, are fairly well-known and, further, under-
stood so favorably. Or in other words, why do lawyers and legal academics
typically know what it means to be "pragmatic," yet few are familiar with
"legal pragmatism?" Part of the answer appears to be related to the un-
synthesized state of contemporary legal thought, where rival ideas about
private autonomy and formal rights dance, as David Kennedy has said, the
"pas de deux" of anti-formalist days and formalist nights." The resistance
to a full acceptance of legal pragmatism is probably at its clearest in the
judiciary, where the idea that there is a separation between law and politics
remains most sacred. Indeed, one of the well-known advantages of separat-
ing out law from politics is the capacity to inoculate dispute resolution from
consequentialist or outcome-based decision-making.36 The job of the judge,
as Chief Justice Roberts has explained, is to be little more than a sagacious
umpire, calling balls and strikes.37 The job, therefore, is one suited for find-
ing the right decision, though not necessarily the most practical decision.
This formalist residue consequently makes it difficult, or at least unsettling,
to think about law in pragmatist terms.38
In the discussion that follows, the argument seeks to highlight the na-
ture of these legal pragmatisms and the significance of their arrival on the
35. David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy, 1994 UTAH
L. REv. 7, 15 (1994).
36. See generally ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, IT'S ALL IN THE GAME: A
NONFOUNDATIONALIST ACCOUNT OF LAW ANT ADJUDICATION (2000).
37. John Roberts, in his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, explained
that:
I have no agenda, but I do have a commitment. If I am confirmed, I will confront
every case with an open mind. I will fully and fairly analyze the legal arguments
that are presented. I will be open to the considered views of my colleagues on the
bench, and I will decide every case based on the record, according to the rule of
law, without fear or favor, to the best of my ability, and I will remember that it's
my job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat.
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (open-
ing statement of Judge John Roberts), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/cogress/sen ate/judici-
ary/sh109-158/55-56.pdf.
38. Unger explains that the modem condition has placed a spell on legal thought:
"As it spreads through the world, rationalizing legal analysis helps arrest the development of
the dialectic between the rights of choice and the arrangements that make individual and
collective self-determination effective-a dialectic that is the very genius of contemporary
law." UNGER, supra note 12, at 39. Anticipating the discussions on experimentalism later in
the article, Unger goes on to say that "The most important way in which it does so is by
acquiescing in institutional fetishism." Id.
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shores of American legal thought. It begins in Part II by providing a brief
philosophical background primarily concerned with the argument between
consequentialism and philosophical pragmatism, an argument over the vi-
ability of moral foundations. Part III grafts the discussion from Part II onto
the law, tracking its development from Holmes to legal realism to present-
day legal pragmatism. In addition to mapping the three major sects of legal
pragmatism, the discussion also argues that something critical was lost in
the evolution from realism to pragmatism, due in part to the dialectical rela-
tionship present in the realist attack on Classical Legal Thought, but absent
in the mish-mashed milieu of contemporary legal thought. As for the map
itself, I take Thomas Grey and Daniel Farber to represent eclectic pragma-
tism, Richard Posner to represent economic pragmatism, and Charles Sabel,
William Simon, and Michael Dorf to represent experimental pragmatism
(though few of the authors would likely use these labels themselves). Fi-
nally, the Article concludes with some considerations of legal pragmatism's
penchant for false promises and its entrenchment of neo-formalism.
II. FIGHTING FOR FOUNDATIONS: CONSEQUENTIALISTS VERSUS
PRAGMATISTS
In the field of moral philosophy, a consequentialist perspective is one
that assumes a given act's moral status to depend on the goodness of that
act's outcomes.39 Of course, many non-consequentialists agree that out-
comes are an important part of identifying what makes a particular act a
properly moral one." What distinguishes the consequentialist is that she
regards outcomes as the only factor necessary for determining moral
status." For this reason, the consequentialist is morally required to act in
the way that will produce the best consequences-other considerations are
only secondary to this first-order principle of action towards best conse-
quences. This principle, however, is incapable of actually telling the conse-
quentialist what to do in any particular situation: she knows that she wants
to act in such a way that it will yield good results, but she knows nothing yet
of what distinguishes a good consequence from a bad one.
Consequentialism places a determination of what constitutes a good
consequence (a theory of the good) prior to what counts in determining the
39. See generally CONSEQUENTIALISM (Philip Pettit ed., 1993); CONSEQUENTIALISM
(Stephen Darwall ed., 2003).
40. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 74-78 (1987) (discussing
how ethical inquiries could generally be improved upon by taking more care with consequen-
tialist reasoning).
41. Some consequentialists, however, draw a distinction between formulas that
encourage a view that is exclusively involved with consequences, and views that require that
exclusivity. See Philip Pettit, The Consequentialist Perspective, in THREE METHODS OF
ETHICS: A DEBATE 92, 132 (Marcia W. Barron et al. eds., 1997).
[Vol. 2007:565
At War with the Eclectics
right act in a given situation (a theory of the right).42 Thus, consequentialist
action is entirely dependent on the acquisition of a separate normative prin-
ciple. Philip Petit explains that consequentialism "amounts to nothing more
than the view that rightness is determined on the basis of the promotion of
... [neutral and universal] values; it says nothing on what the relevant val-
ues are."'43 In this view, it is important to distinguish right acts from good
results. Rightness is parasitic on goodness such that we know some option
to be the right one because it best coheres with the value that has been iden-
tified as the good one; but the converse does not hold: something is good
because it is good, not because it is right. Utilitarianism is probably the
most well-known example of a consequentialist theory of the right com-
bined with a particular theory of the good.' The utilitarian concept of the
good turns on happiness, such that the more of it that is maximized, the bet-
ter overall. If we call a theory of the good that emphasizes pleasure or hap-
piness "welfarism," utilitarianism can be understood as the sum of welfa-
rism (a theory of the good) and consequentialism (a theory of the right).45
The famous antagonist of this ordering is the deontologist.46 Deonto-
logical perspectives can be said to place the right prior to the good, revers-
ing the consequentialist grammar (this does not mean, however, that the
good must be understood as a function of the right), and in so doing place
42. SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATVE ETHICS 61 (1998).
43. Pettit, supra note 41, at 132.
44. For a discussion, see STEPHEN DARWALL, PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS 109-38 (1998).
45. KAGAN, supra note 42, at 61-62. Another aspect of consequentialism concerns
whether it is the agent's own assessment of the situation or the objective ultimate impact of
the act that determines the act's moral status. Kagan suggests that this reveals a distinction
between subjective and objective forms of consequentialism. In the subjective breed, "we
will say that if in fact all the available evidence supported the belief that the given act would
have the best results-if this was the conclusion that any reasonable person would have
reached-then this was indeed the right act for the person to choose." Id. at 65. The objec-
tive view, in contrast, actually looks to the all-things-considered "objective" impact, so that
we might say that even though it had appeared reasonable at the time, a particular act was
actually immoral because it surprisingly produced a bad result. Id. This space between the
objective and subjective strains likely turns on whether one looks to morality as a standard
for evaluating acts, or as a guide for decision-making. What these views have in common,
however, is the first-order consequentialist principle. But both versions encounter the same
criticism: what good is a method that requires the agent to spend all his time calculating the
best consequences? An agent that spends all day calculating will not likely produce the best
consequences (as that agent understands them to be), and so perpetual analysis would in
itself be contrary to the consequentialist method. The way out is to simply adopt whatever
method yields the best results, and in moral theory, this typically relies on common sense and
habit. Ultimately, however, the question of calculation and method is a strictly empirical
one, and therefore a point on which the consequentialist should not have a per se answer.
Indeed, in the consequentialist world, the only thing that is per se is that right acts are those
that lead to the best consequences. See id.
46. One of the most famous neo-Kantian, deontological philosophers is John Rawls.
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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an independent moral constraint on a theory of best consequences.47 For
example, says the deontologist, an act might result in the maximization of
the good, but it is nonetheless the wrong act to take if it violates some
higher normative principle, such as not doing harm to an innocent person.
The demands of "justice" or "fairness" or "categorical imperatives" place
the right act of protecting the innocent superior to the interest in maximizing
the good.48
In contrast to this well-known distinction between consequentialist
and deontological ethics is a fundamental quality shared by both: a com-
mitment to moral or philosophical foundations. This type of commitment is
one that holds that basic beliefs about moral goods structure the justifica-
tions for right acts. The utilitarian believes that a correct decision will be
the one that maximizes welfare; a deontologist might believe that a correct
decision will be one that never involves lying. It is unnecessary for either
actor, in terms of their own justificatory schemes, to explain why it is that
welfare is a moral good, or lying is a moral bad. Foundational beliefs need
not be inferred from other knowledge points. The idea is rather that these
basic beliefs sit at the bottom of the decision-pyramid, laying the founda-
tion. Of course, when the two people meet, they will need to rationally jus-
tify their choices to one another, but in terms of the ethical systems them-
selves, they both share the quality of having a rooted set of goods that are
not inferentially dependent on any other good. For foundationalists, the
buck stops with the good.49
At first glance, pragmatism appears to have much in common with
consequentialism.5 Pragmatism is, after all, very concerned with conse-
47. KAGAN, supra note 42, at 70-77.
48. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary
Gregor ed., 1998).
49. See generally ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS (1981).
50. It seems settled that if pragmatism has a view on deontological ethics, it is de-
cidedly negative. This generalization would probably be accurate were it not for scholars
writing in the tradition of Jirgen Habermas. See Maeve Cooke, Meaning and Truth in
Habermas 's Pragmatics, 9 EUR. J. PHIL. 1 (2001); WILLIAM REHG, INSIGHT AND SOLIDARITY:
A STUDY IN THE DISCOURSE ETHICS OF JORGEN HABERMAS (1994). For Habermas, pragmatic
philosophy is deontological and neo-Kantian, and so, while out to displace the consequential-
ist, he is also out to displace the future-loving pragmatist unable to say which way and how.
In William Rehg's discussion of Habermas, the relationship between the right and the good
begins with a distinction between ethical and moral claims, where ethics concerns values that
are inter-subjectively constituted through social agreements within a particular community,
while moral norms set constraints on action between and among various communities. Ethi-
cal values are broad and flexible, while moral claims (in the form of norms and rules) are
obligatory restraints. This division resembles the separation of procedural justice from the
substantive good-hard and fast rules that dictate the shape of the game in which we all
decide for ourselves (individually and collectively) what we want to become. A central
argument here is that since there will inevitably be a multiplicity of value-theories operating
in a given society, a scheme of reflexive justification and practical reason is necessary to
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quences. Two primary ways in which the philosophies diverge from one
another, however, include the pragmatic takes on "right acts" and theories
of the good. Where the consequentialist argues for a decision or act to be
the right one when it has the best consequences, the pragmatist challenges
the traditional modes by which "best consequences" have been determined.
Where the consequentialist tests an understanding of consequence against a
foundation of basic beliefs, the pragmatist denies the dualism of acts
(means) and goods (ends).
The classic forms of pragmatism were famously developed by a group
of American philosophers working at the turn of the nineteenth century."
Among them were William James and John Dewey, who argued for a focus
on the "principle of practice," where truth and meaning could best be under-
stood as a matter of consequences and effects, rather than in abstracted in-
quiries into phenomenological essences. 2 It was a mistake, James ex-
plained, to lose ourselves in discussions that ultimately had little purchase
on the course of our lives; the better option would be one that simply asked
whether a given idea, concept, or system proved useful: "The pragmatic
method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that other-
wise might be interminable."53  By settling such disputes through a re-
orientation of which questions mattered and which ones did not, pragmatism
opened the way for "clear thinking." For example, a pragmatic approach to
the question of whether God exists would dismiss theological distinctions of
spirit and body, free will and determinism, or good and evil. The pragmatic
approach would ask whether a belief in God proved useful and whether the
consequences of acting on such a belief made the world, in the view of the
believer, a better place. 4 The "truth" of God's existence, therefore, could
insure non-strategic social integration (which Habermas believes to be a requirement for
liberal democracy). In order for this to work, however, moral considerations must "allow for
it, i.e., only so far as an individual can bring his or her notion of the good into harmony with
rules of cooperation acceptable to all." REHG, supra, at 99. See also Karl-Otto Apel, Plural-
ity of the Good? The Problem of Affirmative Tolerance in a Multicultural Society from an
Ethical point of View, 10 RATIO JURIS 199 (1997); Pablo de Greiff, Habermas on National-
ism and Cosmopolitanism, 15 RATIO JURIS 418 (2002).
51. William James is credited with having popularized the term "pragmatism" in an
1898 lecture titled "Philosophical Conception and Practical Results," though James ex-
plained that he had actually borrowed the concept from Charles Sanders Peirce. MENAND,
supra note 26, at xiii. It turned out, however, that Peirce was not a great fan of James' tell-
ing, and Peirce instead introduced a label that he thought better captured the merits of his
thinking: "pragmaticism." MENAND, supra note 26, at 350-51. Peirce thought that this word
was awkward enough that it would prove difficult in attracting a following. Id. He appears
to have been correct. See KARL-OTTo APEL, CHARLES S. PEIRCE: FROM PRAGMATISM TO
PRAGMATICISM (1995).
52. William James, quoted in MENAND, supra note 26, at 95.
53. Id. at 94.
54. WILLIAM JAMES, THE WILL TO BELIEVE: AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR
PHILOSOPHY (1979). For a thorough examination of James' ideas on the construction of truth
Fall]
Michigan State Law Review
be framed in a way that enabled action in the face of a stymied agnosticism.
The concept of God's existence was meaningful and true if the concept
cashed in for the believer.5
A quick sketch of this pragmatic approach to decision-making yields
at least four basic elements. The first is instrumentality. 6 This is not to
suggest instrumentality in the sense that decision-making should be viewed
as an instrument for the realization of some projected goal; rather, inquiries
should be instrumental in that the inquiry should be most concerned with its
effects, i.e., what will be the consequences for this decision? Dewey's vi-
sion of pragmatic instrumentality rejected dualisms that purport to catego-
rize certain subject areas as amenable to scientific inquiry and others as
not." This position suggested that it was a mistake to identify a sharp con-
trast between the worlds of ethics and science, where rigorous thinking
could be applied to the one and not the other." The "logic of inquiry,"
Dewey believed, was equally applicable in every context, and the supersti-
tions that underscored these divisions were fodder for the pragmatist ma-
chine. 9
and meaning, see Hilary Putnam, James's Theory of Truth, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION
TO WILLIAM JAMES 166 (Ruth Anna Putnam ed., 1997).
55. James' well-known approach to meaning was to ask: "What is its cash-value in
terms of practical experience?" William James, quoted in PRAGMATISM 1997, supra note 26,
at xiv. For further discussion on pragmatism and religion, see WILLIAM JAMES, THE
VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A STUDY IN HUMAN NATURE (1963); Eugene Fontinell,
James: Religion and Individuality, in CLASSICAL AMERICAN PRAGMATISM, supra note 24, at
146; Mikael Stenmark, Theological Pragmatism: A Critical Evaluation, 41 HEYTHROP J. 187
(2000).
56. See, e.g., John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 19
(1924) [hereinafter Dewey, Logical Method and Law]. Sydney Hook, Thinking as Instru-
mental, in PRAGMATISM 2004, supra note 26, at 21; Thomas C. Grey, Freestanding Legal
Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 21, 23 (1997) [hereinafter Grey, Freestanding]; Nicholas
Rescher, Functionalistic Pragmatism, 32 PHIL. F. 191, 193 (2001).
57. John Dewey, The Pattern of Inquiry, in PRAGMATISM 2004, supra note 26, at
222 [hereinafter Dewey, The Pattern of Inquiry]; Jose Medina, In Defense of Pragmatic
Contextualism: Wittgenstein and Dewey on Meaning andAgreement, 35 PHIL. F. 341 (2004).
58. Dewey, Logical Method and Law, supra note 56, at 21; Dewey, The Pattern of
Inquiry, supra note 57, at 233.
59. Id. See also John E. Smith, Dewey on Inquiry and Language: After Bentley, in
DEWEY, PRAGMATISM, AND ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY, supra note 28, at 133. In articulating
the basis of pragmatic inquiry, Dewey had in his sights the specter of logical formalities: the
logic of syllogisms, deduction from general principles, "fixed forms," and "rigid demonstra-
tion." Dewey, Logical Method and Law, supra note 56, at 21. When we come to face a par-
ticular problem, Dewey explained, it is very rare that we come pre-equipped with a set of
premises and principles that work as guides for action. If this were the case, then it would be
possible to simply deduce a correct act in a given situation from the storehouse of rules
locked up in the attics of our brains. Dewey, along with the other pragmatists, just didn't see
it that way. Id. at 23. What actually happens is that "we generally begin with some vague
anticipation of a conclusion (or at least of alternative conclusions), and then we look around
for principles and data which will substantiate it or which will enable us to choose intelli-
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The second and third elements in the pragmatist tool-kit are denials of
the means/ends and facts/values dualisms. As for means and ends, this was
a subject with which Dewey spent a good deal of time, arguing against what
he believed to be the supremacy of ends over so-called "means."6 Pragma-
tism might work as a method for clearing the way for new thinking on a
matter, so the criticism went, but at bottom, a style of inquiry could be no
more than that-a style or a method. The issue to which such a method was
directed-the ends or values sought-would always remain something
separate from the means of pragmatic inquiry. Thus, the logic of inquiry
separate from a theory of the good, or a "theory of reality,"'" or some nor-
mative picture towards which action should be directed, could never go very
far. Dewey's rebuttal began by suggesting that a dualism at work in this
criticism-that between means and ends-was a false one: the logic of
pragmatic inquiry was the means and the end, all at the same time.62 The
gently between rival conclusions." Id. In order to capitalize on this human fact, the ten-
dency to begin with questions instead of answers should be amplified by the tools of science.
This is not to say that the scientific method as used precisely by physicists or chemists should
be taken as the procedure by which one decides whether to buy a new car. It is to say, how-
ever, that the decision-making procedures should be similar in form:
Men first employ certain ways of investigating, and of collecting, recording and us-
ing data in reaching conclusions, in making decisions; they draw inferences and
make their checks and tests in various ways ... [Such a decision] comes into exis-
tence without any conscious thought of logic, just as forms of speech take place
without conscious reference to the rules of syntax or rhetorical propriety. But it is
gradually learned that some methods which are used work better than others.
Some yield conclusions that do not stand the test of further situations; they produce
conflicts and confusion; decisions dependent upon them have to be retracted or re-
vised... Thus logical theory becomes scientific.
Id. at 19.
60. See, e.g., John Dewey, The Ethics of Democracy, in PRAGMATISM 1997, supra
note 26, at 182. This piece of the argument picks up on the reconstructive chunk of Dewey's
philosophy. As this Section is meant to only use Dewey as a representative of the common
pragmatist denominator, it would be inappropriate to include Dewey's own thoughts on
democracy and growth. On Dewey's ethics, and how he related them to pragmatism, see
generally DAVID L. HILDEBRAND, BEYOND REALISM & ANTIREALISM: JOHN DEWEY AND THE
NEOPRAGMATISTS (2003); TODD LEKAN, MAKING MORALITY: PRAGMATIST RECONSTRUCTION
IN ETHICAL THEORY (2003); STEVEN FESMIRE, JOHN DEWEY & MORAL IMAGINATION:
PRAGMATISM IN ETHICS (2003).
61. Dewey, The Pattern ofInquiry, supra note 57, at 222.
62. Id. at 218-23. Dewey believed that ends qua ends, characterized as principles,
values, or ideals, had for far too long held dominance over the means by which such ideals
were meant to eventually be realized. "Means have been regarded as menial, and the useful
as servile." Id. at 219. Ideals, on the other hand, are regarded as lofty, aspirational, and
often disconnected from the realities of practice. If we turn our eyes away from the language
of ends and ideals and towards the world as it actually functions, Dewey believed, we would
be doing no more than reconciling our language with the practice of people in their everyday
lives: "After a polite and pious deference has been paid to 'ideals,' men feel free to devote
themselves to matters which are more immediate and pressing." Id. at 220. The way for-
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arguments against the facts/values dualism is not far behind. "Knowledge,"
Dewey argued, is little more than the "beliefs" a given community has cho-
sen to bestow with the "compliment" of calling it truth.63 The heart of the
argument here has already been laid out: in Dewey's attack on general prin-
ciples, syllogisms, and abstractions, he was not simply saying that they, by
and large, do not really work the way we often think them to work, i.e., as
conceptual frameworks from which we deduce practical answers to contem-
porary problems. In addition to this, Dewey is also arguing against the
power of tradition and history as claims on our abilities to work problems
out in present time. Just as the means/ends dualism mystified the impor-
tance of consequences, the facts/values dualism mystifies the contingency
of history.' 4
The fourth element is anti-foundationalism. The pragmatic method-
with its emphasis on inquiry and context-looks a lot like what consequen-
tialism could become if its theory of the right was severed from its founda-
tional theory of the good. Where the consequentialist will eventually say
that whatever belief it is that tells her how to tell a good consequence from a
ward, consequently, was to do away with the dualism that propagated the notion that means
are only meaningful to the extent that they are connected up with a set of ideals. Ultimately,
it was by treating general principles and traditional customs as little more than revisable
hypotheses through the operation of pragmatic inquiry that the role of reason could take on
"revolutionary" qualities. Dewey argued that the use of formal reasoning and antecedent
rules "sanctifies the old; adherence to it in practice constantly widens the gap between cur-
rent social conditions and the principles used by the courts." Dewey, Logical Method and
Law, supra note 56, at 26. To focus on the means through the rigors of pragmatic and scien-
tific inquiry was, for Dewey, the end in itself. Of course, Dewey also had other goals in
mind, such as the realization of an ever-advancing deliberative democracy, but to the degree
that such an entity would grow, it would live or die by the rule of reason as practiced in the
loving care of logical inquiry. Id.
63. 1 RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM AND TRUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS 24 (1991).
64. PUTNAM, DICHOTOMY, supra note 29, at 30-31. Recalling Dewey's argument in
favor of bringing scientific inquiry into the domain of ethics, it should be noted here that the
claim turns in the other direction as well. As Hilary Putnam has explained, Dewey, along
with the other classic writers, believed that "normative judgments" included a much broader
universe of decisions than the traditional dichotomy empiricism had established with respect
to "facts" and "values." Id. For the pragmatists, just as ethical decisions deserved rigorous,
consequentialist analysis, it was important to recognize that "science" was just as norma-
tively dependent and constrained as "morality." Id This insight-that assumptions in favor
of coherence, parsimony, consistency, and rationality were normative choices-was similarly
at odds with David Hume's argument that an "ought" can never be derived from an "is." Id.
It was not that the pragmatists contested the idea that there was a distinction between a de-
scription and a prescription. The idea was that a description was always a choice, and if the
descriptive procedure followed a given set of value-judgments (like the scientific method),
then that description was in fact a prescription on how to talk about our environment. In
order to create the maximal amount of discursive space, said the pragmatist, it was better to
characterize the things called "facts" as values that had, through the course of history, habit,
and custom, attained a status called "objectivity." Id.
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bad one, that belief is not inferentially dependent on some other belief. This
non-inferential quality does not exist for pragmatists, as their beliefs and
decisions are constantly and continually open to question and revision: good
decisions will be the decisions that are the most useful, and useful decisions,
to the degree that it is worth using the term, are the most "moral."65 If con-
sequentialism is a "simple theory of the right," pragmatism might be a
"complex" theory of the right. Consequentialism's simplicity turns on its
relation with a foundational set of basic beliefs; pragmatism's complexity
turns on the absence of such a foundation, where the inquiry just never leads
to a "right" decision at all.66 Thus, the pragmatist preoccupation with con-
sequences has nothing to do with moral superiority. Universal moral truths,
to the extent they exist, could only be detected after a long stretch of deter-
mined inquiry,67 or, more likely, not at all.6"
A key aspect of the pragmatist approach, however, is that a realization
on the unlikelihood of universal truth did not produce catatonia. For prag-
matists like Dewey, it was clear that human beings will always make mis-
takes, that it will be unlikely that absolute truths will ever be reachable, but
that it was essential that the experimental drive remain anti-skeptical and
optimistic in the hope for social growth.
The fight against foundationalism continues to be an essential element
in the modem pragmatist method, though it does at times get a little tricky.
Consider Richard Rorty's defense of a pragmatist "ethic" in Philosophy and
Social Hope. "What matters for pragmatists," Rorty explains, "is devising
ways of diminishing human suffering and increasing human equality, in-
creasing the ability of all human children to start life with an equal chance
of happiness."69 This normative aspiration, however, "is not written in the
stars, and is no more an expression of what Kant called 'pure practical rea-
son' than it is of the Will of God."7 This interest in alleviating human suf-
fering cannot be supported by a transcendent moral principle because such
things have never existed. Following the classic writers, Rorty argues that
"such principles are abbreviations of past practices - way of summing up
65. Stanley Fish is a strong, contemporary advocate of the pragmatic critique of
foundations:
If you say that someone or something is wrong, you will often be asked to provide
a basis for your judgment that is independent of the social, political, and biographi-
cal circumstances in which it was formed... [N]o such basis is available and the or-
dinary resources that come along with your situation, education, and personal his-
tory are both all you have and all you need.
STANLEY EUGENE FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE
PRACTICE OF THEORY N LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 293 (1989).
66. Id.
67. See MURPHY, supra note 30, at 55.
68. See RORTY, MIRROR, supra note 29, at 5.
69. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE xxix (1999).
70. Id.
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the habits of the ancestors we most admire."'" If we tend to admire the idea
that human beings should be treated as ends and never as means, then this
should be understood as a "habit of action" that has produced better results
than other habits. If, however, it turns out that the categorical imperative is
no longer doing its work, then we should revise in favor of a practice that
happens to work better. The choice, however, to embrace one "principle" at
the expense of another cannot be a product of rational deduction or induc-
tive generalization. A love of egalitarian justice, for example, may be in
tension with the principle that "it would be better to have no son than to
have one who is homosexual."72 "Those of us who would like to put a stop
to ... gaybashing produced by [such] firm moral principles call such prin-
ciples 'prejudices' rather than 'insights."' 73 The maneuver that enables one
to label the one principle a prejudiced one, says Rorty, is one that says
egalitarianism is more rational than gaybashing. "But to say that they are
more rational is just another way of saying that they are more universalistic
- that they treat the.., difference between gays and straights, as relatively
insignificant. But it is not clear that failure to mention particular groups of
people is a mark of rationality."74 In the end, our goals might be "worth
dying for," but we should not rely on universalizing impulses in the guise of
rationality or "supernatural forces" in order to back them up." All we can
do is what might have "seemed like the best thing to do at the time, all
things considered." 6
Given this perspective on the implausibility of moral foundations, as
well as when we recall the pragmatist rejection of the means-ends dualism,
it is a little confusing when Rorty states, as quoted above, that "[w]hat mat-
ters for pragmatists is devising ways of diminishing human suffering ......
Perhaps he meant, "what matters for me is..." To suggest otherwise seems
to collide with Rorty's oft-stated claim that pragmatism lacks any particular
politics. That is, a person's views on meaning, truth, knowledge, and action
will not give you a window on whether his politics are those of a Nazi, left-
ist, or compassionate conservative.77 After all, as Rorty has explained, an
interest in devising ways of diminishing human suffering is not the only
interest out there, and so the question must be put to the pragmatists: if
"pragmatism" rejects moral foundations and denotes a way of thinking with
no special political valence, what guidance is offered to those who have
71. Id.
72. Id. at xxx.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at xxix.
76. Id. at xxx.
77. Id. at 23-24. See also Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Po-
etry of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1811, 1812 (1990).
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been sold on the idea that the classical dualisms are bunk, that meaning is a
function of the benefits a practice happens to provide, but who want to
know how best to determine "benefits"? How best to determine the useful
results from the bad? As we have seen, the consequentialist answer is to
look to your theory of the good, while the deontological perspective will
defer to a rationalized set of universal principles. What does the pragmatist
say? Here is Rorty's response:
When they are asked, 'Better by what criterion?', they have no detailed answer,
any more than the first mammals could specify in what respects they were better
than the dying dinosaurs. Pragmatists can only say something as vague as: Better
in the sense of containing more of what we consider good and less of what we con-
sider bad. When asked, 'And what exactly do you consider good?', pragmatists
can only say, with Whitman, 'variety and freedom,' or, with Dewey, 'growth'...
They are limited to such fuzzy and unhelpful answers because what they hope is
not that the future will conform to a plan, will fulfil an immanent teleology, but
rather that the future will astonish and exhilarate.
78
While Rorty's "ethic" remains inescapably vague, it is confined to
such vagueness lest the pragmatic method turn into precisely what it is out
to destroy: foundational philosophies of the good and the right. Modem
pragmatism thus seems to balance itself on the edge of a blade, looking nos-
talgically back at Dewey's moral ambition, yet constantly keeping itself
from indulging in a normative stance. As Stanley Fish suggests,
Turning into just another would-be foundation-into another theory that would
then have consequences-is always the danger pragmatism courts when it becomes
too ambitious... [W]hatever form it takes, the [ambitious] project. is an instance of
what I call the critical self-consciousness fallacy or antifoundationalist theory
hope, the fallacy of thinking that there is a mental space you can occupy to the side
of your convictions and commitments, and the hope that you can use the lesson
that no transcendent standpoint is available as a way of bootstrapping yourself to
transcendence....79
It is this non-normative, apolitical stance with which pragmatism, es-
pecially in the context of the law, has become most fascinated. In the next
Part, it is suggested that the career of legal pragmatism, as a descendant of
legal realism, might not have developed in this apolitical direction.
78. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE, supra note 69, at 27-28.
79. STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE 305 (1999). See also Stanley
Fish, Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1447, 1457-
58 (1990).
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III. MAPPING LEGAL PRAGMATISM
A. From Subversion to Complacency: Legal Realism and Legal Pragma-
tism
While these themes were gaining steam in the fields of philosophy,
psychology, and education in the early years of the twentieth century, the
figure that stands as the pragmatic interlocutor for law was Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr.8" Holmes moved in the same Cambridge circles as James,
Peirce, and other members of the so-called "Metaphysical Club,"'" but it
was the work of John Dewey that moved him. 2 Despite this linkage be-
tween Holmes and the classical pragmatist movement, however, Holmes did
not introduce a "pragmatic theory of the law." What he did instead was
write in 1897 one of the legal profession's most influential legal articles-
"The Path of the Law,"8 3 initiating a critique of what was then the dominant
mode of legal reasoning-Classical Legal Thought. 4 Holmes believed that
it was nonsense to characterize the law as a formal body of concepts that, if
properly studied, could canvass the landscape of legal problems. 5 Rather,
the law is nothing more than a prediction of what a particular judge will
have decided in a given case. The life of the law, then, is not an evolving
discovery through logical exercise of the hidden mysteries of a platonic set
of legal ideas; it is an evolving experience by which judges apply their best
ideas to contemporary problems. As Holmes said so well,
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which
it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.
8 6
Holmes' perspective, along with those of writers like Wesley Hohfeld,
served as the backdrop for what became the legal realist movement. 7 Legal
80. See generally Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L.
REv. 787 (1989) [hereinafter Grey, Holmes].
81. MENAND, supra note 26, at 204.
82. Id. at 437.
83. Holmes, supra note 1.
84. For an overview of this critique, see Kennedy, supra note 4.
85. Holmes, supra note 1.
86. Id. at 469.
87. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-
Coercive State, 38 POL. SC. Q. 470 (1923); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913); Morris R. Cohen,
The Process of Judicial Legislation, 48 AM. L. REv. 161 (1914); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND
THE MODERN MIND (1930); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935); Karl N. Llewelleyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence -
The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 431 (1930). For further discussion, see MORTON
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realism, as Morton Horwitz has explained, was largely concerned with dis-
pelling legal superstitions and fetishes in the law and was thus an approach
with a clearly negative orientation-its aim was subversive.88 Horwitz de-
scribes the movement as "more an intellectual mood than a clear body of
tenets, more a set of sometimes contradictory tendencies than a rigorous set
of methodologies or propositions about legal theory."89 Building on these
early attacks on formalism, the "legal realists" of the inter-war period, in
Horwitz's words, challenged "the political and moral assumptions of the old
order and the structures of legal doctrine and legal reasoning that were de-
signed to represent those assumptions as neutral, natural, and necessary.""
The traditional attacks included critiques of the distinction between the
natural, apolitical character of the private legal order and the contestable
domain of public law; the plausibility of being able to meaningfully deduce
answers to factual questions from abstracted legal concepts; the lack of em-
pirical studies that should accompany the process of legal reasoning in the
service of conceiving a fully realized sociological context for legal decision-
making; the circularity and indeterminacy inherent in reasoning about legal
"facts;" and a systematic penchant for moving away from policy analysis,
despite the inescapable policy implications of legal decision-making.9
Might legal realism just as well have been called legal pragmatism,
where Holmes and Hohfeld are accompanied by James and Dewey as the
fathers of the legal realist movement? After all, the lines of attack bear un-
deniable similarities. They reject logical deductions from foundational prin-
ciples, they are suspicious of moral sensibilities as guides for functional
decision-making, they prefer consequentialist-based decision-making, they
look to history for its usefulness and not its imprimatur, and they favor ex-
perimentation. In all likelihood, if the phrase "legal pragmatism" had never
emerged, it would be pointless to ask whether the pre-WWII mode of legal
thinking known as realism should have been called something else.
The next Section argues that there is a meaningful difference between
the old legal realism and the new legal pragmatism and that the difference is
largely a political one. Lawyers and jurists working in Lochner's wake and
after the New Deal were realists because they had a concept of the political92
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY (1992); AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993).
88. See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465 (1988).
89. Horwitz, supra note 87, at 169.
90. Id.
91. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal
Thought, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 37-62
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
92. I intentionally refer here to the phrase made famous by Carl Schmidt, though I
do not mean to imply that the legal realists shared Schmidt's understanding of the friend-
enemy dichotomy so important to his theory. Rather, I mean to emphasize the way in which
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that, for them, was far more powerful and robust than was the one being
traded on in the courts. Where formalism and foundationalism prescribed a
huge sphere of private autonomy for the world of contract and property law,
legal realists wanted to open that world up to the heat of political contest.
Legal realism, therefore, had a political and subversive edge that early
twenty-first century pragmatism, to a degree, does not. Ultimately, this is
explained by the fact that the legal realists defined themselves in dialectical
fashion against Classical Legal Thought, although their critiques ended up
being just as applicable to the "social" period as well. Contemporary legal
pragmatism, in contrast, has no thesis with which to offer an antithesis;
rather, it exists, and may come to thrive, in a legal consciousness best char-
acterized by eclecticism.
This "de-politicization" of legal pragmatism makes sense when
viewed against its philosophical background. As described above, the clas-
sic pragmatists also believed in anti-foundationalism and the disutility in
talking about universal moral rights. Neo-pragmatists like Rorty depart
from people like Dewey, however, in what might be termed a radicalization
of the pragmatic impulse away from reconstruction and towards deconstruc-
tion.93 For Dewey and James, pragmatism was very ambitious, despite Fish
and Rorty's complaints. It provided more than the means to clear away
debris; it was a philosophy of change interested in growth, imagination,
democracy, and a "will to believe."94 Guided by an optimistic faith in the
power of scientific inquiry, a prominent pragmatic interest was one of trans-
forming the current world into a better and different one. In the classic
style, then, pragmatism had a politics, which was picked up and contextual-
ized by the legal realists in a largely coherent way.95 Neo-pragmatists like
Rorty and Fish, however, foreclose the possibility of pragmatic politics
through a public-private cleavage.96 That is, the transformation that takes
the realists, like Schmidt, understood how liberal legalism tends to obscure the politics of the
private. See CARL SCHMIDT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (George Schwab trans., 1976);
CHANTAL MOUFFE, ON THE POLITICAL (2005).
93. RICHARD RORTY (Charles Guignon & David R. Hiley eds., 2003); ALAN MALA-
CHOWSKI, RICHARD RORTY (2002); SIMON CRITCHLEY ET AL., DECONSTRUCrION AND
PRAGMATISM (Chantal Mouffe ed., 1996); GILES GuNN, BEYOND SOLIDARITY: PRAGMATISM
AND DIFFERENCE IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD (2001).
94. See Singer, supra note 88; see also sources cited supra note 60.
95. See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Isaac, Is the Revival of Pragmatism Practical, or What are
the Consequences of Pragmatism?, 6 CONSTELLATIONS 561 (1999); Paul D. Forster, Pragma-
tism, Relativism and the Critique of Philosophy, 29 METAPHILOSOPHY 58 (1998); Marion
Smiley, Pragmatism as a Political Theory, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1843 (1990).
96. As for Rorty's philosophy/politics divide in the context of law:
I find it hard to discern any interesting philosophical differences between Unger,
Dworkin, and Posner; their differences strike me as entirely political, as differences
about how much change and what sort of change American institutions need .... I
[Vol. 2007:565
At War with the Eclectics
place with respect to a person's relationship with metaphysical questions
under the pragmatist lens does not apply to the public realm of political and
legal discourse. As discussed below, the reception of this cleavage has seri-
ous implications for legal pragmatism. 7
B. The Players
Jules Coleman has described the flight of pragmatism into legal circles
in a less than admirable fashion: "Pragmatism, a term with a long and illus-
trious history in American philosophy, has had the great misfortune of fal-
ling into favor among the American legal academy, where it is too often
reduced to a series of slogans providing cover for a flourishing philosophy-
made-easy school of legal theory."9 Coleman is right to complain that legal
pragmatism has enjoyed a less than consistent career among legal academ-
ics: at times legal pragmatists look complacent and status-quo oriented,"
while at other times legal pragmatists seem to be parodying law and eco-
nomics. Much of the time, legal pragmatists have used pragmatism to mas-
querade particular norms as a guide for legal reasoning. Part of the problem
for legal pragmatists has therefore been this topsy-turvy take on the pub-
lic/private, philosophy/politics distinction. Depending on your point of
do not think that one has to broaden the sense of "pragmatist" very far to include
all three men under this accommodating rubric.
Rorty, supra note 77, at 1813. This distinction should not be confused for the public-private
distinction described in the context of Classical Legal Thought where there are separate
domains for the law of the state (constitutional, administrative, and criminal law) on the one
hand, and the law of the market (property, contract, and tort) on the other. For contemporary
analysis, see Symposium, The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1289 (1982);
Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REv. 1497 (1983).
97. Rorty believes that that philosophy is a post-Renaissance "transitional genre"
and that the field, as we know it, is on its death bed. This transition is situated between the
old world of religious redemption and a nascent literary culture which will offer "redemptive
truth" by "making the acquaintance of as great a variety of human beings as possible." The
projects of modem analytical philosophy are pointless, and, on this view, perishable. Rich-
ard Rorty, Philosophy as a Transitional Genre, in PRAGMATISM, CRITIQUE, JUDGMENT, supra
note 30, at 3.
98. JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST
APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 6 (2001).
99. Although his brand of pragmatism is of a different flavor, Jules Coleman agrees
with the philosophy/politics divide:
As a holist'and a pragmatist ... I cannot and do not deny that moral norms may in
some way enter into the sphere of considerations that govern concept revision -
they may do so whether the issue is our concept of law or our concept of laundry.
What I deny is that our concept of law answers to moral or political norms in a way
that makes the analysis of that concept primarily a matter of substantive moral or
political argument.
Id. at 4 n.3.
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view, a legal pragmatist tends to either look apolitical in the style of Richard
Rorty, moral in the style of consequentialism, or experimentalist in the style
of John Dewey. The following sections elaborate on these distinctions by
categorizing legal pragmatists as eclectic, economic, and experimental.
1. The Eclectic Pragmatist"°
The eclectic style has a taste for consequentialism, a mild dose of em-
pirical study mixed with a gentle historical gloss, a lukewarm dissatisfaction
with legal formalism and grand theory, is preoccupied with adjudication,
and gets queasy around "political issues." This queasiness, or political nau-
sea, comports with Rorty and Fish's belief that it is very important to main-
tain a separation between the private world of metaphysical contemplation
and the public world of political and legal discourse. The other elements
consist in an affirmation of the private pragmatist mode of reasoning: "an
encompassing orientation towards inquiry-one that stresses the agent's
perspective; the interaction of impulse, habit, and reflection; and a holistic
100. I take the best representatives of this view to be Thomas Grey and Daniel Far-
ber. To a lesser extent, Cass Sunstein fits here as well. See Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other
Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal Theory, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1569 (1990) [here-
inafter Grey, Hear]; Grey, Holmes, supra note 80; Grey, Freestanding, supra note 56; see,
e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Foreword: Building Bridges over Troubled Waters: Eco-pragmatism
and the Environmental Prospect, 87 MINN. L. REv. 851 (2003); Daniel A. Farber, Legal
Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1331 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Incom-
pletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1733 (1995); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE
CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999); see also J. M.
Balkin, The Top Ten Reasons to be a Legal Pragmatist, 8 CONST. COMMENT. 351 (1991). As
Duncan Kennedy has described it, this eclectic method, or to use Kennedy's phrase, policy
analysis, involves "the commitment to balancing conflicting policies, with an eye to conse-
quences, in a context in which rules represent no more than the means to implement the
resulting compromise .... Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal
Legal Rationality or Max Weber's Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of
Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1073 (2004). Although Kennedy does not
use the word "eclectic" in the way being used here, it seems that much of his "conflicting
considerations approach" maps onto the eclectic pragmatist. Consider his discussion of the
product of realist critique and Weberian legalism:
The best way to understand the Unitedstatesean development would be this: The
U.S. post-social scholars accepted and even greatly intensified the abuse of deduc-
tion critique, but recognized Weber's (and others') critique of the social as threat-
ening diffuse judicial usurpation and incalculability. The danger was particularly
obvious in the United States, where progressive forces had struggled for several
generations against conservative judge-made constitutional law restrictive of the
very reforms advocated by the social people. Both the rise of policy and the devel-
opment of human rights judicial review were post-realist responses to these chal-
lenges. This means that Weber's sociology of law was not prophetic-not LFR but
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approach to justification."'' The confluence of these two elements-an
affirmation of pragmatic decision-making and an affirmation of a separation
between philosophy and law-produces eclectic pragmatism.
Two prominent pragmatist scholars are illustrative of this position. 2
The first, Thomas Grey, is especially well-suited to highlight the distinction
between eclectics and the third category (experimental pragmatism), as
Grey had at one time rejected the public-private distinction only to later
embrace it. In an early article,0 3 Grey suggested that pragmatism, when it
was wielded by a judge like Holmes, yielded Dewey's belief in the "trans-
formation of means into ends."'" This transformation of what appears at
first to be simply a means (such as a system of laws), into an end in and of
itself (due process), is an illustration of legal pragmatism at its finest: "Le-
gal pragmatism thus understood is receptive to the classical republican con-
ception both of law as a constitutive element in political life, and of politics
itself as an activity of intrinsic as well as instrumental value."' 5 Although
Holmes was "an instrumentalist without an adequate system of ends' 0 6 (and
despite Holmes' admittedly conservative orientation), Grey hardly consid-
ered this a problem. A pragmatic judge armed with the capacity for seeing
ends where others saw only means was, for Grey, a highly exciting prospect
for legal reasoning.
To see by pragmatist lights changes the way a person goes about un-
derstanding the world and understanding what types of justifications are
legitimate and which are not. In the words of Louis Menand, "pragmatism
cannot help acting the role of termite-undermining foundations, collapsing
distinctions, deflating abstractions, suggesting that the real work of the
world is being done somewhere other than in philosophy departments."'0 7
101. Grey, Freestanding, supra note 56, at 21-22.
102. Jules Coleman would probably fall into this group due to his philosophy/politics
distinction. Coleman's pragmatism does not use much of the vocabulary common to the
other legal pragmatists, and consequently, I will not discuss his position in any depth here.
At a glance, Coleman's method has five elements. See COLEMAN, supra note 98, at xiii. The
first two, "semantic non-atomism" and "inferential role semantics" involve the basic notion
of indeterminacy and relational meaning: words do not generally have meanings that can be
gleaned independently from the other parts of the semantic system, and much of the meaning
will necessarily come from inferences involved in the practice of that word or word-set. Id.
at 6-7. The third and fourth elements, "explanation by embodiment" and "holistic perspec-
tive," state the importance of understanding how the variously interconnected concepts that
fill out a concept comprise a general principle, and how such principles are to be viewed
holistically through the set of practices that embody them. Id. at 8. Finally is the familiar
theme of "revisability," which applies not only to empirical mistakes but to so-called analyti-
cal truths which have been at the center of the neo-pragmatist critique. Id. at 8-9.
103. Grey, Holmes, supra note 80.
104. Id. at 853 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes).
105. Id. at 861.
106. Id. at 850.
107. PRAGMATISM 1997, supra note 26, at xxxi.
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Pointing to Menand's reference to the unbounded exhilaration in the prag-
matic turn where one has "the sense that a pressing but vaguely understood
obligation has suddenly been lifted from their shoulders," '' ° Grey has said
that "[b]ecoming a pragmatist . . .feels more like a conversion than like
being persuaded that a proposed deal is reasonable."'0 9
Thanks to an intervention by David Luban, however, Grey reeled in
his position.' A person may very well come to a pragmatist point of view
on epistemological and metaphysical questions on the right and the good,
but what does this have to do with the very practical work of legal reason-
ing? In making his reversal clear, Grey introduced the example of two law-
yer-friends: a deeply theistic Christian and a humanist atheist."' They
wildly diverge on their views of foundationalism and truth but both agree
that legal analysis should be rooted in custom and practice, proceed instru-
mentally such that it serves the human good, and shy away from formal and
over-inclusive legal theories in favor of experimental case-by-case trial and
error."2 There is, therefore, little connection between a person's philoso-
phical views and their choices on whether to adopt certain styles of legal
reasoning. Pragmatic philosophy, as a consequence, should have little to
say about legal pragmatism.
The result, for Grey, is the separation of philosophy from law: free-
standing legal pragmatism. Many scholars appear to agree that freestanding
legal pragmatism is not very exciting.' The exhilaration and exuberance
affiliated with tearing the walls of history asunder is nowhere to be found in
the freestanding approach. It is, in fact, particularly banal-a middle of the
road approach to legal reasoning and adjudication that mediates the pulls
between competing economic and cultural approaches to the law. This
characteristic, however, is not a problem for eclectics. It is rather an advan-
tage: a mediating force between the foundational pitfalls of grand theory
and the anti-intellectualism of a "business-as-usual" approach."' The
108. Id. at xi.
109. Grey is not suggesting here that pragmatism recommends a particular meta-
physical view, but that pragmatism recommends a particular way to view metaphysics.
Grey, Freestanding, supra note 56, at 22. This is a nod in the direction of Richard Posner,
whom Grey lumps together with Holmes, Pound, Cardozo, and Fuller as one of the great
legal pragmatists. Id.
110. In a critique of Grey's account of freestanding legal pragmatism, David Luban
has written that "[e]clectic, result-oriented, historically minded antiformalism is indeed free-
standing-but legal pragmatism disconnected from the philosophical impulse purchases its
independence at the cost of condemning itself to meaninglessness." David Luban, What's
Pragmatic About Legal Pragmatism?, 18 CARDozo L. REv. 43, 65 (1997).
111. Grey, Freestanding, supra note 56, at 38-42.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., RONALD DwORKiN, JUSTICE IN ROBES (2006); Richard Rorty, The Ba-
nality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of.Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1811, 1812 (1990).
114. Grey, Freestanding, supra note 56, at 38.
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model, as mentioned above, makes good on the basic pragmatist anti-
foundational moves in the valance of contextual and instrumental argument,
but it stays its hand from the philosophical muscle that renders legal deci-
sion-making a metaphysical enterprise in the Holmesian style.
For more on the banality of this approach, consider the second legal
scholar in this category. For Daniel Farber, the key idea, again, is a critique
of foundationalism and an emphasis on "context, judgment, and commu-
nity."'115 This view has several advantages, such as the recognition of endur-
ing disagreement and conflict within a particular political community.
Since conflict will be ever-present, it is important to deal with problems
incrementally and flexibly. A foundational approach based on first princi-
ples cannot do this since it will either be connected up with hard precedents
established by a previous community facing different problems, or with
universal principles assumed to answer all questions for all time. This
eclectic view also has the advantage of being concerned with the conse-
quences of judicial action, where a foundational view will steer decision-
making along a pre-determined course oblivious to how case-specific ar-
rangement actually affects the lives of real people."6 Furthermore, this type
of pragmatism is capable of having respect for precedent when such respect
is necessary, as well as a commitment to fundamental rights. Farber's
pragmatism, therefore, appears to have its anti-foundational cake, and the
fundamental right to eat it, too."'
Indicating once again the interest in "middleness," Farber situates his
brand of legal pragmatism between two extremes of pragmatic decision-
making, where on the one side lives the "activist judge" and on the other
resides the judge committed to the status quo. In Farber's view, the merits
of the pragmatist position are found in a middle approach notable for its
eclecticism:"'
Pragmatism provides no reason to exclude consideration of original intent, prece-
dent, philosophy, social science, or anything else that might be appropriate and
helpful in resolving a hard case. Ideally, all of these factors point to the same out-
come. When they conflict, the only recourse is to make the best decision possible
under the circumstances. Although this methodology, if it can even be called one,
may seem quite open-ended, pragmatists argue that in concrete cases it is often
possible to identify the most reasonable resolution to such conflicts. Decisions are
channeled by the professional training and experienced judgment of the judge,
115. The following discussion is primarily focused on Farber's thinking in the con-
text of constitutional law. In administrative contexts, it may be that he is better captured in
the experimentalist vein of legal pragmatism. Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the
Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1331, 1335 (1988).
116. Id. at 1342-43.
117. Id. at 1348-49.
118. Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-First
Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 163, 169 (1995).
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which do not provide unlimited leeway and may in fact be felt as coercing a single
"right answer."' 19
The judge that best fits this eclectic style is not Holmes, Farber says,
but Louis Brandeis.2 1 Where Holmes was too theoretical, Brandeis empha-
sized technical skill, empirical study, and substantial respect for the limits of
the judicial function-the "passive virtues.' 12' Brandeis represents the best
of pragmatic judging because he loved facts, distrusted theory, and was
open to experimentation, but only in modest doses. The approach is eclec-
tic, drawing on the tools at hand that best fit the task, without falling prey to
the extremes of judicial activism, fetishized ideas about the role of the
founding fathers, or laissez-faire concepts of the de-politicized market.
One question that might be raised at this point is how pragmatic legal
reasoning differs from the classic moves typical of the legal realists. Aren't
scholars like Grey and Farber simply giving a new name to an old concept?
In some sense, the answer must be yes. As was discussed above, legal real-
ists had made plain all Grey and Farber wish to sustain.22 At least one big
difference, however, is the political edge typical among the legal realists
and entirely lacking among the eclectic pragmatists. As will become more
evident in the discussion of the next two types of legal pragmatism, eclecti-
cism is distinguished for exactly the reasons offered by Grey and Farber:
eclecticism is bland and banal, and while it courts experimentation and em-
pirical study, its efforts remain tied to the political orbit of contemporary
legal reasoning.'23
119. Id. (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 175.
121. Id. at 177 (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111
(1962)).
122. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
279 (2001).
123. The nature of that political orbit has been explained elsewhere, and it is beyond
the scope of this Article to discuss it here. Duncan Kennedy writes, "In contemporary legal
theory, policy is always a potential Trojan horse for ideology, just because of the patently
weak rationality of choosing policies by universalizability and then merely 'balancing'
them." Kennedy, supra note 100, at 1076.
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2. The Economic Pragmatist24
In contrast to the dominantly eclectic style of legal pragmatism imma-
nent in the debris of contemporary legal thought, economic pragmatism, as
well as its experimental sibling, trades in eclecticism and political nausea
for more powerfully public methods and explicit normativity. Eclectic
pragmatism, as we have seen, picks and chooses its value judgments from
wherever, using them as the measure by which to decide whether a particu-
lar consequence (e.g., will it "work" to quickly end the 2000 presidential
elections?) is a good one. Economic pragmatism, on the other hand, is quite
clear about setting up a series of norms that should guide a decision-maker
on how to tell the good consequences from the bad. That is, the economic
pragmatist structures legal reasoning to proceed such that "reasonableness"
is unpacked in a way that best describes the real world, where "best" quite
clearly means welfare maximization, efficiency, and rationality.
Economic pragmatism has a champion, and he is Richard Posner.1
25
His particular idea about pragmatism also has a champion, and it is eco-
nomic theory and the heavy lifting it does in unpacking the nature of Pos-
ner's "reasonable" legal reasoning. To be fair, Posner would likely disagree
with his being separated from pragmatists like Thomas Grey. Writing in the
same symposium as Grey's "Freestanding" article, Posner agreed with Grey
on the claim that philosophical pragmatism had nothing to offer legal prag-
124. The representative of this view is Judge Richard Posner. His best summation is
in RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003). For an earlier iteration,
see Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 1 (1997). It might
seem strange to call this category a variant of pragmatism at all. Indeed, there is already a
field of legal thought that captures these ideas, and it is called law and economics. The claim
to legal pragmatism comes from its initial posture, which is a methodological commitment to
the rule of reason, anti-foundationalism, and moderate degrees of interest in history and
empiricism. See infra Subsection III.B.2. By itself, this sounds essentially like the eclectic
view. Where economic pragmatists go out on their own is in their systemic approach to the
rule of reason, which is to define reasonableness in terms of rational choice theory. Id.
I should note here that this discussion is not intended to refer in any way to left-
wing law and economics. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Law and Economics from the Per-
spective of Critical Legal Studies, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND
THE LAW 465 (P. Newman ed., 1998); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An In-
troduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Cap-
ture, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 129 (2003).
125. For perspectives on Posner's pragmatism, see David Luban, The Posner Varia-
tions (Twenty-Seven Variations on a Theme by Holmes), 48 STAN. L. REv. 1001 (1996) (re-
viewing RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995)); Michael Sullivan & Daniel J.
Solove, Can Pragmatism Be Radical? Richard Posner and Legal Pragmatism, 113 YALE
L.J. 687 (2003) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY
(2003)); Jeremy Waldron, Ego-Bloated Hovel, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 597, 600 (2000) (reviewing
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999)); William E.
Scheuerman, Free-Market Anti-Formalism: The Case of Richard Posner, 12 RATIO JURIS 80
(1999).
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matists.' 26 Indeed, Posner and Grey seemed much alike in their respective
approaches, where anti-formalism, instrumentalism, and reasonableness
constituted the bulwark of the pragmatist approach. The fact of the matter,
however, is that a number of significant differences distinguish eclectics
from economists. 127 First is the rejection of the public-private divide. This
issue is tricky, since Posner explicitly says that his brand of legal pragma-
tism is freestanding of its philosophical parentage.' What it is not free-
standing of, however, is economic theory and its attendant assumptions on
human nature and morality. Thus, while economic pragmatists reject one
sphere of philosophical content, they pick up another. The second differ-
ence between eclectics and economists follows from the first, and that is a
consistent way of approaching decision-making through its understanding
of "reasonableness" and "consequences." While eclectics understand these
concepts as essential to their position, the means for their deployment al-
ways remains hostage to the political commitments inherent in the mode of
legal reasoning used by the eclectic practitioner. For the economist, his
political commitments are much more precise, tracking norms like effi-
ciency, welfare, and rationality. As a result, economic pragmatists are
strange birds. They talk the pragmatist talk but walk like economists.
In fleshing out this analysis, this discussion begins by looking at Pos-
ner's theory of pragmatic adjudication, then explores the work that the rule
of reason is doing by incorporating a notion of rationality. Rationality, as
an assumption in theories like rational choice theory, will be argued to be a
value choice, thereby animating Posner's legal pragmatism with the flavor
of foundationalism. In the end, economic pragmatism appears to fall prey
to Fish's foundational-hope theory by merging into consequentialism.
a. Pragmatic Adjudication
Posner's fullest explanation of the theory of "pragmatic adjudication"
is in his book, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, in which he describes it
as a "disposition to ground policy judgments on facts and conse-
quences"12--consequences that are not ad-hoc but that are understood in
light of their systemic implications for the legal system. Posner explains,
however, that the focus on systemic consequences should not be treated as a
126. See Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 124, at 1.
127. As Luban points out, however, there is a great deal of difference between the
claim to political agnosticism on the one hand, and the robust and controversial claims Pos-
ner makes about the rule of reason and its attendant relationship with law and economics on
the other. It is for this reason that Luban reads Posner, at least in 1996, as disagreeing with
Grey's philosophical break. David Luban, What's Pragmatic About Legal Pragmatism?, 18
CARDozo L. REv. 43, 45-46 (1996).
128. See supra note 124.
129. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 124, at 59.
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rule in itself, as this would turn into a kind of formalism with which his
pragmatism, naturally, would find disfavor. 3 ° Rather, a pragmatic judge
should adopt the "pragmatic mood" that will sometimes find it advanta-
geous to focus only on the parties before him or on the need to follow
precedent.' Eschewing formalism as a point of departure, Posner argues
that instead, formalist decision-making should be one of many tools the
pragmatic judge will have at his disposal.'32 Pragmatic adjudication will
consequently be spotted with "formalist pockets,"'33 which stand for the
values in stability and predictability served by only slowly adjusting the
status quo and the expectations that underlie it. Furthermore, since judges
can hardly be expected to always take an "all-things-considered" account in
the decision-making, they will sometimes have to dispense with moods and
rely on rules.'34 This reliance will not be due, however, to any requirement
of precedent per se, but will be attractive because it is the most reasonable
course of action in that particular context. This formalism also takes shape
in the form of judicial limits or boundaries. These limits include the rare
times when a dispute will have such a clear answer that to decide against
precedent will have untoward effects on the legal system, and the separation
of powers doctrine which forbids judges from deciding questions in ways
that exceed their jurisdiction.'35 Even if the best consequences demand a
decision that would override, say, the political question doctrine, or bla-
tantly flout precedent, the reasonable judge will be bound to refrain from
making what appears to be the best decision. 6
Posner has recognized the similarities his program shares with conse-
quentialism and has attempted to separate the two with reference to his em-
phasis on the ultimate criterion of reason. Posner says,
If a consequentialist is someone who believes that an act, such as a judicial deci-
sion, should be judged by whether it produces the best overall consequences,
pragmatic adjudication is not consequentialist, at least not consistently so. That is
why I prefer 'reasonableness' to 'best consequences' as the standard for evaluating
judicial decisions pragmatically.1
37
It is, of course, crucial for Posner to sufficiently make this point. If Pos-
ner's pragmatism can be characterized as a form of consequentialism, he
runs into a problem: his program talks like an anti-foundational method and
walks like a foundational form of ethics, losing all purchase on the pragma-
130. Id. at 64.
131. Id. at 49-55.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 59-60.
134. Id. at 64-71.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 65-66.
137. Id. at 65.
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tist label since pragmatism and consequentialism (in its moral form) are
mutually exclusive ways of looking at the world.
It is hard to see just how Posner gets out of this. Posner's legal prag-
matism can be defined as a decision-making process whereby the best judi-
cial act will be the one with the most reasonable consequences. Consequen-
tialists, in contrast, would replace "reasonable" with "best." Recall from
above that the consequentialist requires a normative theory to inform her
actions on what will be counted as best and what will not. "Best" in this
sense does not have any independent meaning exogenous of the normative
content provided by her theory of the good. When Posner distances legal
pragmatism from consequentialism because it substitutes what appears to be
the more flexible standard of "reasonable" for "best," he makes the mistake
of neglecting the difference between act- and rule-consequentialism.'38 The
account provided thus far has been one of act-consequentialism, but rule-
consequentialism, in contrast, holds that an act will be right to the extent
that it conforms to a particular rule-a rule that is assumed to produce the
best consequences when it is obeyed.'39 Posner gives examples of prag-
matic decisions that will not have the "best" consequences in the short run,
but due to values in predictability, stability, or separation of powers, they
will serve the good in the long term. 4' This is precisely the formulation of
rule-consequentialism, where, for Posner, the rule being served in the long
term is the rule of reason. The set-up is relatively simple: under pragmatic
adjudication, a judicial act is the right one when it has the best conse-
quences, subject to the Rule of Reason. As rule-consequentialists under-
stand, however, this form of the theory is no less held hostage to a theory of
the good than is act-consequentialism.14'
138. To be fair, Posner does discuss rule-consequentialism, but he dismisses it for
reasons that are not altogether clear. See id. at 49.
139. See, e.g., KAGAN, supra note 42, at 223.
140. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 124, at 64.
141. A second way of looking at Posner's legal pragmatism is to emphasize the
phrase "pragmatic adjudication" and the constraints on legal decision-making, in contrast to
a focus on the outcomes of those decisions. That is, Posner appears to conflate a distinction
between the process that leads to an act of judicial interpretation (a consideration of relevant
rules and standards, precedent, and systemic constraints) and the outcomes of the judicial act
itself (a consideration of policy choices on various outcomes). As a consequence, the fairest
reading of Posner's pragmatism seems to be that it aspires to at once perform as a mechanism
for pragmatically discerning legal materials and restraints and pragmatically assessing policy
outcomes. To be sure, Posner believes that the decision-making process is to be impacted by
a judge's evaluation of outcomes, in addition to the other more traditional material. But this
is precisely the point: legal pragmatism marries what might otherwise be two separate sorts
of inquiries, with distinct consequences for how to understand legal pragmatism. For exam-
ple, the equation made above between legal pragmatism and rule-consequentialism is less
tenable when legal pragmatism is articulated exclusively as a method of judicial interpreta-
tion. But this is not what Posner has in mind, for when he describes the task of interpretation
and adjudication, Posner says that it goes in two steps: understanding the rule or standard in
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Posner can reply at this point that legal pragmatism does not have such
a theory of the good, is held hostage to nothing but the constraints a reason-
able perspective on the legal order will understandably entail, and so cannot
be lumped in with other foundational moral systems. This response is mis-
leading to the extent that Posner's basic method does not stop at a decision-
making process whereby the best judicial act will be the one with the most
reasonable consequences. In order to make sense of the paralyzing ambigu-
ity that an emphasis on reason, left by itself, would necessarily imply, Pos-
ner explains that "[p]ragmatic reasoning is empiricist, and so theories that
seek to guide empirical inquiry are welcomed in pragmatic adjudication." '42
The approach to legal problems that best gives content to reasonable deci-
sion-making guided by empirical inquiry, in Posner's view, is law and eco-
nomics.
b. Efficiency and Welfare
Posner's look to law and economics for help in unpacking the rule of
reason in the pragmatic method is not coincidental. In his reading of the
classic pragmatists, Posner sees a rejection of deductive logic and universal
moral truths; the desire to understand propositions by their consequences
and not by their formal elements (if such things could ever be found); and a
"radical empiricism" that advocated an "extension of the scientific method
into all areas on inquiry."'43 This extension opens the door to economic
analysis, but as Posner explains in his most recent statement on this issue,
economics should not become a normative base for judicial action:
But economics, and therefore economic analysis of law, come in both formalist and
pragmatic versions, and it is important to distinguish them. In the formalist ver-
sion, legal decisions are deemed sound insofar as they conform to a given eco-
nomic norm, such as Pareto superiority or wealth maximization. In effect, eco-
nomic logic is substituted for legal logic, but the structure of law remains logical.
In the pragmatic version of economic analysis of law, economic analysis identifies
the consequences of legal decisions but leaves it up to the judge or other policy
maker to decide how much weight to give to those consequences in the decision-
making process. Economics so understood is an empirical social science, not a
body of normative doctrine.144
play, then ascertaining the way in which the purpose of the rule or standard would best be
served. This immediately implicates, once again, the emphasis on reasonable consequences,
and in turn, the parody of rule-consequentialism.
142. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 124, at 77.
143. Richard A. Posner, Legal Pragmatism, 35 METAPHILOSOPHY 147, 148 (2004).
144. Id. at 152. This account seems to draw on Thomas Cotter in his review of legal
pragmatism's relationship with law and economics; at the prima facie level there is a genuine
collision between legal pragmatism's alleged anti-foundationalism and the foundational
emphasis on wealth maximization over distributional equity in law and economics. The
pragmatist decision-maker that is wedded to a law and economics approach will therefore be
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If Posner is right, then it does indeed seem unfair to call the economic
pragmatist a political actor with a theory of the good. He is apolitical, ap-
plying his anti-foundationalism to the law with an emphasis on instrumen-
tality and context, guided by an economically-charged rule of reason. If he
is wrong, and this dichotomy is a false one, Posner falls prey to Fish's foun-
dational-hope syndrome by having smuggled a theory of the good into his
pragmatic adjudication. This is exactly what I intend to presently argue.
14 5
On the opening page of Posner's "Economic Analysis of Law," he
states that "[t]he task of economics, so defined, is to explore the implica-
tions of assuming that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his
satisfactions-what we shall call his 'self-interest. 1 46 Similarly, the first
page of Steven Shavell's "Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law"
states that "the view taken will generally be that actors are 'rational.' That
is, they are forward looking and behave so-as to maximize their expected
utility.' 1 47 Robert Ellickson likewise explains that this central task "consists
of methodological individualism (the assumption that individuals are the
only agents of human action) and the assumption that individuals are self-
regarding and rational."'48 These assumptions on the importance of rational-
ity and self-interest maximization pivot around "the central norm in law and
economics," that of allocative and productive efficiency.149 Economic effi-
caught up in a series of normative views privileging particular types of criteria-an espe-
cially non-pragmatic approach. If the decision-maker retreats from this type of methodologi-
cal exclusivity, however, and maintains Posner's reasonableness as the ultimate criterion,
economic approaches can often be useful for predicting the consequences of certain rules.
The bottom line for Cotter is that the law and economics model, taken alone, is a founda-
tional and non-pragmatic legal theory, but once its user disenchants the method-
understanding its biases and presumptions-the economic approach can assist the pragmatic
decision-maker in her search for predictable results. See Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragma-
tism and the Law and Economics Movement, 84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2098-2114 (1996).
145.. Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques
of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDOzO L. REV. 431 (1996); Duncan Kennedy &
Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1980);
Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); Jean Hampton, Ra-
tional Choice and the Law, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 649 (1992); Mark Kelman, Con-
sumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L.
REV. 669 (1979); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of
Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309 (1985); W. Bradley Wendel, Mixed Signals:
Rational-Choice Theories of Social Norms and the Pragmatics of Explanation, 77 IND. L.J.
1, 50 (2002); Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a
Particular Type o]) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197 (1997).
146. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-4 (5th ed. 1998) (footnote
omitted).
147. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 1 (2004).
148. Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 537, 539 (1998).
149. Russell Hardin, Magic on the Frontier: The Norm of Efficiency, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 1987, 1987 (1995).
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ciency obtains when goods in a society are allocated through voluntary ex-
change into the hands of the people who value those goods the most.'50 The
value of a good is therefore a measure of how much a person is willing to
pay for it, as this is what rational behavior recommends for social welfare.
The queasy feeling that these assumptions might veer towards moral
theory prompted economists in the early twentieth century to figure out how
to adequately compare the utility one person experienced against the utility
another experienced, in terms of their relative degrees of happiness. 5' On
the battle's frontier was Vilfredo Pareto, who developed an efficiency con-
cept predicated on the value an item would gamer as it moved through the
market:'52 Pareto efficiency became a theoretical model that claimed sce-
nario A to be superior to scenario B when no one in B loses anything by
moving to A, and at least one person has gained. As Posner has admitted,
however, Pareto efficiency is often too demanding a criterion for economic
analysis of law because of the impact transactions necessarily have on third
parties.'53 Consequently, the criterion more traveled is the Kaldor-Hicks
concept, sometimes called "Potential Pareto Superiority," which holds that
an outcome will be efficient when the winners in a transaction are capable
of compensating the loser such that no actors are worse off. The big caveat
in Kaldor-Hicks is that the winners, while they should be capable of com-
pensating the losers, are not obligated to do so.
It is common in the literature to refer to a distinction between norma-
tive or ethical economics and explanatory or engineering economics.'54 On
the normative side, the claim is that norms like efficiency and rationality
should guide individual, legal, and social decision-making because they are
values that are best situated to shape a society in which we want to live. In
the context of courts, the normative claim is not simply that judges decide
cases in ways that maximize social wealth, but that social wealth-
maximization should be a, if not the, guiding principle.'55 The norma-
tive/descriptive distinction is crucial for economists in order to maintain that
their work on the way the world really is should be viewed independently of
any arguments over how a society ought to be governed.
150. POSNER, supra note 146, at 11.
151. Hardin, supra note 149, at 1996. This was originally a problem for utilitarian-
ism.
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 83-85 (1978);
Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law
Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 487, 488 (1980).
154. SHAVELL, supra note 147, at 1.
155. The normative claim need not necessarily be limited to the argument that effi-
ciency should be the sole criterion, but inevitably it will be viewed as, at the very least,
among the most important.
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In the 1970s and 1980s, as law and economics was getting its legs
within the legal profession, the normative stakes seemed much more obvi-
ous than they do today, where the majority of law and economics literature
assumes with little (if any) argument its normative superiority. One of the
more well-known instances in which this claim was debated was the contri-
bution made by Ronald Dworkin's 1980 law review article in which he
asked whether wealth was an intrinsic value. 56 If wealth-maximization has
an ethical base, Dworkin surmised, then a society that experiences an in-
crease in value through the maximization of wealth, no matter how small
and barring other changes to that society, will, as a matter of morality, be all
the better for it. Dworkin ultimately argued that this was crazy and in so
doing introduced the example of Derek and Amartya. 157 Derek is willing to
sell a book at a price lower than the price Amartya is willing to pay for it.
Amartya therefore values the book more than Derek. If a hypothetical ty-
rant were to come in and force Derek to give the book to Amartya without
compensation, Dworkin explained, the society now populated by these two
would be a better one since social wealth has been maximized by the book
being in the hands of the person who valued it most. Dworkin then asked
whether we could say that this society was morally superior once the book
had changed hands, excluding all other considerations and testing only for
wealth as an ethical principle. Not surprisingly, Dworkin's answer was
decidedly not. 5 '
In defense of the normative position, Posner clarified that wealth was
viewed as an instrumental value towards the satisfaction of human needs
and desires.'59 Instead of allying his position with utilitarianism, as tradi-
tionally had been done in the field of political economy where it was argued
that society was served best by maximizing utility,"6 Posner suggested that
norms of wealth and efficiency could be supported in Kantian terms. 6' If a
Pareto superior society was one in which all actors were better off, or at
least, some were better and none for the worse, then this must be a society
with which all would consent to be a part. Efficient market transactions,
coupled with consent, therefore nourish a concept of autonomy.'62 This is
not to say that Posner heads in the direction of a Kantian moral theory of
156. Dworkin, supra note 145. Dworkin developed the argument further in Why
Efficiency?: A Response to Professors Calabresi and Posner, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563
(1980).
157. Dworkin, supra note 145, at 197-201.
158. Id. at 197.
159. Posner, supra note 153, at 487.
160. Jules L. Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, 112 YALE L.J. 1511, 1515 (2003)
(reviewing Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002)).
161. Posner, supra note 153, at 490.
162. Id.
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economics. 63 Rather, the position is one of "constrained utilitarianism."
"The constraint, which is not ad hoc but is supplied by the principle of con-
sent, is that people may seek to promote their utility only through the mar-
ket or institutions modeled on the market. '""6 Thus, consensual transactions
would be assured, 65 and efficiency and wealth-maximization could be
grounded in the ethical terms of individual rights and autonomy-seeking,
and as a consequence, an argument as to why economic analysis ought to
have a greater role in social decision-making. 6  Or so the argument went.
Posner's Kantian adventures were by no means the extent of the nor-
mative defense. Indeed, much more recently, Louis Kaplow and Stephen
Shavell have argued that the norm of personal welfare, as mediated by the
efficient allocation and production of social resources, should be the only
principle with which the legal decision-maker should be armed.'67 In par-
ticular, Kaplow and Shavell have argued that (1) fairness considerations
either end up serving a welfare interest, or if they are altogether independent
of a welfare criterion, they systematically produce undesirable social conse-
quences; (2) fairness considerations are at best subsidiary to welfare consid-
erations and are at worst in conflict with human welfare, and as a conse-
quence; (3) deontic preferences for justice or fairness should be abandoned
in favor of efficient allocations of goods that best approximate the needs of
social welfare.'68
This approach to a normative defense of the law and economics ap-
proach is quite different than the round of arguments made in the 1980s.
Kaplow and Shavell presume that there is something intuitively desirable
about efficiency as a first principle, and once it is claimed that fairness con-
siderations violate that first principle, the burden falls on deontologists to
show how fairness can, in fact, serve efficient ends.'69 The big difference
between the two debates is that what was once understood as an issue for
actual debate in terms of justification and legitimation (i.e., whether effi-
ciency and wealth-maximization could be normatively defended on moral
grounds), now happily operates as the default position where the burden is
on non-welfare considerations to show how they do not threaten social wel-
fare. What looks here to be little more than a tautology that can quite easily
be turned around (if there is a conflict between fairness and welfare, why
163. Id. at 496.
164. Id. at 497.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961, 967 (2001).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 971.
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does welfare not need to defend its transgressions?) has been discussed in a
number of criticisms. 1
70
For presentpurposes, however, one only needs to describe the norma-
tive discussion, and not to solve it. Posner's claim, after all, is that law and
economics will serve legal pragmatism best when it is not in its normative
frame but is simply explanatory. This more modest approach, which is
called empirical, descriptive, predictive, explanatory, and engineering, is
focused on the tools with which economics brings to bear on legal questions
without suggesting an answer. The point is to simply give the decision-
maker a picture of the way things really are: what consequences certain
decisions will have on the allocation of goods and resources as mediated by
rational actors pursuing their self-interests. Distributional concerns are not
part of the calculus (on the Kaldor-Hicks model, anyway), but, says the em-
pirical economist, there is nothing stopping the decision-maker from mak-
ing choices that emphasize justice over welfare. The purpose of the econo-
mist is only to provide data on the consequences of such a decision, not to
provide a logic for the decision itself. One assumption which appears to
enable this argument in favor of modest explanations of what is really hap-
pening in the world is that the central assumptions track what is really hap-
pening in the world. That is, the explanatory model insists that it is not
normative because it says nothing on the matter of how people ought to
behave. It only illuminates the consequences of -human behavior. Of
course, this is hardly pragmatic, recalling Dewey's critique of the fact/value
dualism, in which it is impossible to see where normativity ends and the
purely "descriptive" begins.
Before moving to the discussion itself in the next Section, however, an
introductory caveat should be offered. The following argument will not
require a fight between two pragmatisms: those belonging to Dewey and
Posner. Rather, the argument against the descriptive/normative split will
come from within economic theory itself and rest heavily on the work of
Amartya Sen. It is important to be clear, however, about what will pres-
ently be argued, and what will not. The argument will be no more than this:
it is a mistake to believe "descriptive" economics to be free from choices
about and interpretations of the fundamentals of human behavior. So-called
descriptive economics, as a result, cannot be defended in a non-normative
170. This critique is made powerfully by Jules Coleman, supra note 160. For other
critiques, see Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and
the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000); Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing
the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003 (2001); Hanoch Sheinman, Are
Tradeoffs Between Justice and Welfare Possible? Calabresi and Dworkin on the Normative
Foundations of Law and Economics, 64 MD. L. REV. 250 (2005); Jon Hanson & David Yosi-
fon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power
Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003); Brett H. McDonnell, The
Economists' New Arguments, 88 MINN. L. REV. 86 (2003).
[Vol. 2007:565
At War with the Eclectics
light since there is nothing intuitively natural or necessary about those par-
ticular assumptions. And if these assumptions are not natural or necessary,
and could just as well be replaced by categorically different ideas about the
nature of self-interest and human behavior, it is impossible to defend Pos-
ner's normative/descriptive distinction in the way he intends.
However, it is here that one could misunderstand this argument and
take from it a pragmatist point that is not altogether necessary. In pointing
out the choices immanent in the construction of a "descriptive" economics,
it simply does not follow that one must believe that there are in fact no dif-
ferences between what the economic discipline understands as its "norma-
tive" and "descriptive" strands. Indeed there are differences between the
two, and descriptive economics, even after it has been undressed in a Sen-
nian way, does not require the decision-maker to argue for results that track
economic principles. For Posner's economic pragmatism to ultimately
avoid falling into consequentialism, however, it must inoculate itself from
Fish's foundational-hope syndrome. Given the normative choices necessary
to the very particular formula of rational choice theory, however, Posner
fails.
c. Rational Choice: A Theory of the Good
If it turned out upon reflection that neo-classical economic models do
not actually track real world behavior, but instead privilege only one of
many particular ideas about how people should behave, it would necessarily
mean that a choice had been made to model one type of behavior over
available alternatives. If there is indeed a choice here, then the move to
privilege rationality in economic modeling is a normative one. If there are
alternative ways of conceiving human behavior, so says rational choice the-
ory, the model that ought to be followed is the one that favors a conception
of rational, self-interested actors seeking to maximize their wealth. The
argument that defriptive economics involves just such choices and inter-
pretations has been offered by scholars like Amartya Sen in his discussion
of rational choice theory-the model of human behavior that underscores
neo-classical economics. 7 '
171. See AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 26-33 (2002) [hereinafter SEN,
RATIONALITY]; Amartya Sen, Description as Choice, 32 OxFORD ECON. PAPERS 353 (1980).
For an earlier version of the critique, see Kant's distinction between actions done by natu-
rally sympathetic people ultimately working from the ground of "self-love," and action done
from moral duty. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 73-74
(Thomas E. Hill, Jr. & Arnulf Zweig eds., Arnulf Zweig trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2002)
(1785).
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Sen begins his critique by separating out three elements of rational
choice theory which are often conflated under the one rule of self-interest
pursuit:
(1) that behavior is regular enough to allow it be seen as maximizing behavior with
an identifiable maximand; (2) that the maximand is interpretable as the self-interest
of the person; and (3) that the self-interest of the person is narrowly self-centered
and is unaffected by the interests of others and about the fairness of processes. 1
72
Of these three, Sen is primarily concerned with the second element
(the one specifying the maximand as one concerned with self-interest), as he
agrees with the first element and acknowledges that the third has been justi-
fiably extended and critiqued by scholars like Gary Becker, Richard Thaler,
Christine Jolls, and Cass Sunstein. 73 What Sen does not see in these cri-
tiques, however, is any issue taken with (2), and consequently, therein lies
the heart of his attack.
The articulation of a maximand interpretable as personal self-interest,
Sen argues, begs for a good deal of unpacking. 74 First is the question of
"self-interest." Sen suggests that in rational choice theory there are typi-
cally three types of self that float in and around this usage: self-centered
welfare, self-welfare goal, and self-goal choice.' 7 "Self-centered welfare"
is the notion that a person's welfare is exclusively a function of how her
personal needs are satisfied, without any regard whatsoever for the needs of
others. 76 "Self-welfare goal" is the orientation towards maximizing self-
centered welfare. 77 "Self-goal choice" is the restraint placed on the types of
choices a person has at her disposal by selecting only those life choices that
explicitly track the self-welfare goal.'78 These three selves, therefore, repre-
sent first the root conception of personal welfare, then the articulation of
that conception as the goal of human behavior, and lastly the demand that
all choice be directed towards effecting that goal. This, Sen explains, is
"self-interest pursuit" as understood in mainstream rational choice theory.
The second question that follows from the second premise in rational choice
theory (that the maximand is interpretable as the self-interest of the person)
concerns Sen's use of the word "interpretable." It is Sen's claim that the
three types of self that are conflated into "self-interest pursuit" is only one
of many various maximands that might be available as a metric for rational
172. SEN, RATIONALITY, supra note 171, at 30-31.
173. GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES (1996); Christine Jolls, Cass R.
Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 150 STAN. L.
REv. 1471 (1998).
174. SEN, RATIONALITY, supra note 17 1, at 30-34.
175. Id. at 33.
176. Id. at 33-34.
177. Id. at 34.
178. Id.
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behavior, and to interpret the maximand as one that must only be concerned
with self-interest pursuit is to make an arbitrary choice. As Sen explains:
[Rational Choice Theory] has tended to choose, fairly arbitrarily, one very narrow
interpretational story, rejecting other rival understandings of what can lie behind
the regularity of choices and the use of goals and values .... For example, the
analysis of "efficiency" of legal arrangements (including "the hypothesis that the
Common Law is efficient") is thoroughly dependent on interpreting the maximand
in a very specific way, and in particular in taking the maximand to be exclusively a
reflection of the welfare of the person involved. 9
After having unpacked self-interest pursuit as involving three distinct
types of claims and having argued that the selection of these three claims is
exactly that-a selection, a choice, or an interpretation-Sen explains that
the interpretation of the maximand as self-interest pursuit makes two mis-
takes.' The first is a distancing from the role of ethics, and the second is a
distancing from the role of freedom.'' Sen explains that the core constitu-
ent of self-interest pursuit, that of self-centered welfare, has already been
sufficiently critiqued."2 What remains, however, is the argument that even
an extended version of self-centered welfare--one that incorporates the
human tendencies towards altruism and stupidity-still sets the table for
self-welfare goal and self-goal choice.'83 Here, Sen brings in ethical consid-
erations to argue that it is simply wrong to believe that human goals pivot
round an extended welfare conception, and that human choices track those
goals.'84 In making this argument, Sen introduces the distinction between
sympathies and commitments, where sympathy is defined as "one person's
welfare being affected by the state of others."'8 5 That is, when a person
spends time and money fighting for the rights of people on the other side of
the world-time and money that does not yield any tangible increases in
their personal welfare-this kind of behavior can still be explained as self-
interested because the person has been made happy by her work, or satis-
fied, or perhaps advantaged by a strategy of helping others such that she
might be helped herself later on. Whatever the reason, the human rights
advocate's sympathies can be explained by rational choice theory because
the person's self-interest has been served, even if not in the classic style of
wealth-maximization.
Sen does not argue that it is impossible that any of these rationales
might actually have determined the course of action taken by the human
179. Id. at 28 (citation omitted).
180. Id. at 42-43.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 35-36.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 36.
185. Id. at 31.
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rights advocate.'86 The mistake, he argues, is that this modeling is espe-
cially vulnerable to a claim of over-inclusiveness.'8 7 What if the human
rights advocate has more than sympathy, but has a "commitment" to helping
these people? Perhaps there is something more going on in the decision-
making process that enables a person to make a choice that should not really
be included in the self-interest ambit. This inclination leads Sen to argue
that advocates of the self-interest pursuit model are gobbling up too much;
there is simply a lot of behavior that cannot be explained that way.
The idea of commitments, or what Kant would have called duties,
helps Sen make the argument out: whereas sympathies cause problems for
the traditional form of self-centered welfare, commitments erode the "tight
link between individual welfare (with or without sympathy) and the choice
of action."'' 8 That is, sympathies may or may not involve rearrangements of
a person's self-conception, but commitments go beyond the ways in which
we categorize our values and infect our goals and choices themselves.
Thus, the human rights advocate may choose a certain course of action not
because she feels joy or satisfaction, but because she is committed to an
ethical principle, and that principle guides her goals and choices. A typical
reply would ask whether the commitment, in the end, is not followed simply
because it is a course that somehow adds to the advocate's overall utility or
happiness in some way. If it did not, then why would she have adopted the
principle in the first place? Sen's response points out that it seems highly
unlikely that the advocate's choice will typically be justified (even to her-
self) on the grounds that the decision to act makes her happy, or that a fail-
ure to act would cause her suffering; rather, the success or failure may very
well have the side effects of bringing happiness or suffering to the advocate,
but it must be the case that at least sometimes these effects are little more
than symptoms and not actual causes.'89 Sometimes, a person's motivation
will be grounded in ethical considerations and a commitment to action, and
while it may have emotional side effects, it cannot always be entirely justi-
fied in and of itself by those effects. Sen writes,
[When the advocate makes her decision to act,] [s]he may or may not actually suf-
fer, and also the extent of that suffering, when it exists, may be too small to justify
the kind of sacrifice that may be involved in pursuing social justice or fairness at a
personal loss in other ways. But most important, it has to be acknowledged that a
commitment can be a reason for action irrespective of any personal loss suffered
from the failure of one's commitment.
190
186. SEN, RATIONALITY, supra note 171, at 36.
187. Id. at 35.
188. Id. at 35.
189. Id. at 34-35.
190. Id. at 35.
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In his examination of self-interest pursuit, Sen thus uses the idea of
ethical commitments as a wedge, prying the notions of self-welfare goal and
self-goal choice loose from the conception of self-centered welfare.'91 It is
not necessary to Sen's argument that self-centered welfare be much differ-
ent from the mainstream conception; all that is argued here is that our goals
and actions need not mechanically follow from that conception. Sometimes
our goals may reflect ethical commitments, the realization of which, no mat-
ter how pleasurable or horrible, cannot always be justified by self-centered
welfare. They come from someplace else. It is here that Sen suggests the
other part of the puzzle (besides ethics) that has been missing, and that is
freedom.'92
If the classical forms are correct, and there exists a universal and un-
wavering relationship between the ideas that individual behavior is regular
enough to conceive of it as generally maximizing, and that what is being
maximized is the pursuit of self-interest, Sen is wrong that the maximand
has been interpreted to mean self-interest. The maximand is self-interest,
and that's all there is to it. If Sen is correct, however, and the maximand
has been interpreted to refer to only one particular style, and that other rea-
sons, like ethical commitments, can also play decisive roles in the behavior
meant to be maximized, then the classical argument has placed an unneces-
sary constraint on what counts as rational behavior. If this constraint is re-
moved, there is room to discuss a fourth type of self, in addition to the three
types already discussed (self-centered welfare, self-welfare goal, and self-
goal choice). This fourth type is motivated by a freedom unavailable to the
"self-interest pursuit" concept, since it is a self whose goals and choices can
come from either sympathies or commitments, no matter how varied."' The
only constraint that Sen applies to this fourth self is that of "reasoned scru-
tiny"-Sen's standard for rational behavior."l This is the self that is able to
reason about his choices, his goals, his sympathies, his commitments, and is
fundamentally free to do whatever he wishes. That is, as long as the wish
has been subject to reasoned scrutiny.'95
Interestingly, Sen's story of rationality and reason serves as the in-
verse of Posner's. As will be recalled from above, Posner's legal pragma-
tism begins by claiming that a judicial act is right when it has the most rea-
sonable consequences."' A judge will be assisted in determining when the
191. Id. at 35-36.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 36.
194. Id. at 47.
195. For more on the idea of practical reasoning, see generally DEREK PARFIT,
REASONS AND PERSONS (1984); T. M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998);
ETHICS AND PRACTICAL REASON (Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut. eds., 1997).
196. See supra Subsection III.B.2.
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consequences have been reasonable by looking to the classic economic as-
sumptions on the role of efficiency in guiding rational actors seeking to
maximize their interests. For Posner, "reason" serves as little more than a
doorway through which one then comes to rational choice theory. Scratch
reason and you find rationality beneath. Sen's story, as we have seen, goes
in the other direction. If we begin by asking what rational behavior is, the
assumptions of rational choice theory quickly rise to the surface. Once
these assumptions are interrogated, they deconstruct, revealing their con-
stituent parts, and once these constituencies are revealed, Sen argues, two
1ioints emerge. 97 One is that ethical considerations, despite having been
ignored by economists for almost a century, wreak havoc on the self-interest
pursuit model, and as a consequence, the assumptions of rational choice
theory do not logically follow from one to the next.'98 The "fact" that what
is maximized by human beings is their self-interest subsequently transforms
into an interpretation-a normative choice of one model among others.'99
Sen's second point is that rationality, thus critiqued and when best con-
strued, turns out to be a doorway to freedom and "reason."' ' "°
It is beyond the scope of this Article to go more in depth as to the con-
tours of Sen's notion of reasoned scrutiny. The present argument, after all,
does not concern who is ultimately right in this very long and controversial
debate. It is instead concerned with the alleged non-normativity that Posner
hopes to find in descriptive economics and the critique of that idea. If Sen
is right that the move which privileges self-interest as the maximand is a
choice and an interpretation, then there seems little in the way of defending
description as a non-normative enterprise. To be sure, there would still re-
main significant differences between various types of claims, i.e., the claim
that efficiency and wealth-maximization are the norms that will best guide
decision-making, and ought to be foregrounded as such, is different from
the claim that economic analysis is offered as a way of predicting and de-
scribing the consequences of rational, self-interested actors operating in a
market. This is also not the same as arguing that there is no distinction be-
tween facts and values, or that "normative economics" is not substantially
different from "descriptive economics." What the critique does disclose,
however, is that when Posner seeks to avoid consequentialism by pointing
to his preference for descriptive over normative economics in making sense
of pragmatic adjudication, he fails. Although Posner successfully avoids
the strong "oughts" of normative economics, he nonetheless reels in the
197. SEN, RATIONALITY, supra note 171, at 42-43.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 50.
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strong "oughts" immanent in the choices required by rational choice the-
ory.
2 0 1
3. The Experimental Pragmatist2
The third category of legal pragmatists, experimental pragmatists, is
more aligned with philosophical pragmatism than with either of the previ-
ous two.2 3 Experimentalists look to put more muscle on the basic legal
pragmatist framework of anti-formalism, consequentialism, and contextual
reasoning by looking to the classic writers, as well as critical traditions in
social theory and democratic experimentalism. 2°  What experimentalists
201. See supra Subsection III.B.2.
202. The primary texts used in this Subsection are Charles F. Sabel & William H.
Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARv. L. REV.
1016 (2004); William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist
Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 174-75 (2004); Michael C.
Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
267, 270 (1998).
203. Much of the literature that constitutes the experimental approach has a critical
lineage and goes under the name of some or another anti-status-quo nom de guerre. In an
article surveying this literature, Orly Lobel lists a number of the labels: "reflexive law," "soft
law," "collaborative governance," "democratic experimentalism," "responsive regulation,"
"outsourcing regulation," "reconstitutive law," "post-regulatory law," "revitalizing regula-
tion," "regulatory pluralism," "decentering regulation," "meta-regulation," "contractarian
law," "communicative governance," "negotiated governance," "destabilization rights," "co-
operative implementation," "interactive compliance," "public laboratories," "deepened de-
mocracy and empowered participatory governance," "pragmatic lawyering," "nonrival part-
nership," and "a daring legal system." Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation
and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 346-47
(2004) (citing Dara O'Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Sys-
tems of Labor Standards and Monitoring, 31 POL'Y STUD. J. 1 (2003)); Gunther Teubner,
After Legal Instrumentalism? Strategic Models of Post-regulatory Law, 12 INT'L J. SOC. L.
375 (1984); IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE
REGULATION (2002). Other representatives of the experimental approach include Charles F.
Sabel, Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development, in THE HAND-
BOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 138-65 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 1994);
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist
Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as
Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Para-
digm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001); James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory
Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183 (2002); Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek, Mind the
Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. 1 (2002);
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001); Louise G. Trubek & Maya Das, Achieving Equality: Healthcare
Governance in Transition, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 395 (2003).
204. See supra Part II.
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share with economic pragmatists is a heavy concern with social science and
empirical study. They want to know what is going on in the world, and, like
economists, are ready to become J.D./Ph.D.'s to figure it out. As for the
public-private distinction, experimentalists are very clear in that they wish
to take the metaphysical critique and push it into the public realm.2"5 For
these scholars, the normative impulse is subversive, seeking change and
reform through the constant transformations of trial-and-error. Despite the
familiarity, however, experimental pragmatism is not another name for legal
realism. It is notably an artifact of contemporary legal consciousness for its
tendency, as will be explained, to elaborate the experimental impulse in the
language of "social conceptualism.""2 6 Legal realism, with its critique of
individualism and the abuse of deduction, did not.2"7
In making out this argument, it is useful to detail the experimentalist
rejection of the public-private distinction. Where Rorty, Grey, and Posner
(in failed attempt) argue for a separation of philosophy from the world of
law and politics, experimental pragmatists instead draw on Dewey's recon-
structive philosophy, and more recently, Roberto Unger's democratic ex-
perimentalism."8 In order to get a sense for what this means for experimen-
talists, consider Menand's view that pragmatism provides "the sense that a
pressing but vaguely understood obligation has suddenly been lifted from
their shoulders."2 9 One imagines a sweeping, swooning feeling where the
newly-baptized pragmatist who had once seen life as a constrained set of
choices and dogmas is now opened up to the limitless vistas in his possible
alternative futures. The experimental pragmatist takes this excitement, pulls
it from the private space, pushes it into the public, and arrives, quite dra-
matically, in the world of an unbound pragmatism which contributes, in
Unger's words, to a person's "raising up to godlike power and freedom-
and the deepening of democracy-that is to say, the creation of forms of
social life that recognize and nourish the godlike powers of ordinary human-
ity, however bound by decaying bodies and social chains."2 '
The significance for legal pragmatism when the public-private distinc-
tion is relaxed can consequently be quite great. The persistence of the dis-
tinction immunizes eclectic pragmatism in its characterization of public
discourse from the destabilizing effects of philosophical deconstruction.
205. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
206. See Symposium, Is It Time For a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WiS. L. REV. 335,
356-57 (2005).
207. Kennedy, Two Globalizations, supra note 8, at 651.
208. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE
ALTERNATIVE (1998); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, POLITIcs: THEORY AGAINST FATE
(Zhiyuan Cui ed., 1997).
209. PRAGMATISM 1997, supra note 26, at xi.
210. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE SELF AWAKENED: PRAGMATISM UNBOUND
28 (2007) [hereinafter UNGER, THE SELF AWAKENED].
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Once the private-public partition is lowered, these effects spill into the pub-
lic realm. This is the maneuver of experimental pragmatists, who argue for
the application of pragmatic rejuvenation to the public mind, just as phi-
losophers have favored it in the contexts of truth-seeking and belief forma-
tion for private individuals."'
For William Simon, one of the scholars this discussion takes as repre-
sentative of the experimental strain, legal pragmatism has a number of in-
gredients. First is a perspective that emphasizes the responsibilities of citi-
zens to take active and deliberative roles in participatory government."'
Immediately, then, we can see how this version moves away from Rorty's
public-private distinction, pushing pragmatic reform into the levers of gov-
ernance. Second, this reliance on individual initiative moves legal pragma-
tism away from a dependence on the judiciary and towards involvement in
civic associations and non-governmental organizations."' This kind of
strategy is conducive to a third ingredient, which is a governance that is
decentralized, flexible, and open to rolling rule regimes." 4 Fourth, legal
pragmatism is consequentialist such that solutions take priority over rights-
claims."5 To some degree, this factor is based on the pragmatic argument
against foundations and first principles, i.e., if we cannot accept the morality
of individual rights as a deontological given, why should they have trump-
ing power over other forms of problem-solving? Simon's account provides
a second way of differentiating experimentalists from the eclectic and eco-
nomic versions of legal pragmatism: the method is more than a preoccupa-
tion with context, consequence, and adjudication; it is interested in new
governance strategies, public deliberation, and the experimentalism inherent
in a destruction of the means-end dualism.
21 6
A second distinguishing characteristic of the experimentalists is the
normative underpinning which generates the move to ignore the public-
private distinction in the first place. That is, it is not an arbitrary move to
say, as experimentalists do, that the philosophical power of the pragmatist
method should be transposed onto public discourse. The motivation appears
to be rooted in a basic disposition lacking among eclectics and economists,
and that is a disposition towards reform. Experimentalists are discontent
with liberal social arrangements and the attendant distributional effects in a
way that the other camps are not: they see something wrong with the world,
and they want to fix it.2t7 What distinguishes experimental pragmatists,
211. See Singer, supra note 88.
212. Simon, supra note 202, at 174-75.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 176.
215. Id. at 177-78.
216. Id.
217. See infra text accompanying notes 238-56.
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however, from their counterparts in the 1980s and '90s writing under the
labels of crits or feminists21 8 is that where these reform-minded pragmatists
came at the law from a distinctly left-liberal position, experimental pragma-
tists view themselves as "post-left" and increasingly preoccupied with tech-
nocratic/managerial reform perspectives. Whether this "technocratic turn"
has the stuff to make pragmatists like Menand swoon or Unger feel as if we
have been raised to God-like powers is a question for another time. Here,
the discussion turns to some of Unger's experimentalism and illustrative
writing from Sabel, Simon, and Dorf.
a. Ungerian Experimentalism
According to Unger, the classic pragmatists sacrificed the seeds of a
potentially powerful philosophy "to a range of costly and unnecessary con-
cessions. '  These concessions all involved an affiliation with "natural-
ism." Unger argues that Dewey's vision is tripped up by a contest between
his double emphases on human agency and an evolutionary naturalism,
where the second idea inevitably consumes the first. Unger suggests that
Dewey, Peirce, and James all suffer from equivocations between the power
of human agency and evolutionary naturalism, thus depriving pragmatism
of the "means with which better to serve the cause of democratic experi-
mentalism."22 Instead of realizing its potential by categorically distancing
itself from naturalism, pragmatism has been reduced to what I have been
calling its everyday, or eclectic variety: "it has been turned into another
version of senility masquerading as wisdom... [a] doctrine of shrinkage, of
retreat to more defensible lines, of standing and waiting, of singing in our
chains ... ."221 If we could make good on the ideas that were at the core of
the pragmatist project, and unchain the philosophy from its present state,
Unger suggests that we could denaturalize society and culture; we unfreeze
them:
It is as if, in the physical world, a rise of temperature were to begin to melt down
the stark distinctions among things, returning them to the indistinct flow from
which they came. To the extent we move in this direction, the facts of society and
culture cease to present themselves to our consciousness as an inescapable fate
218. For a discussion, see Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism
and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); Jay M. Fineman, Practical Legal Studies and
Critical Legal Studies, 87 MICH. L. REv. 724 (1988). There was also a variant of legal
pragmatism that attempted to merge liberalism with the pragmatic approach. See Margaret
Jane Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practice,
139 U. PA. L. REv. 1019, 1049-51 (1991); Robin L. West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A
Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. PiTr. L. REv. 673 (1984).
219. UNGER, THE SELF AwAKENED, supra note 210, at 29.
220. Id. at 36.
221. Id. at 1.
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.... [P]ragmatism [] is the theory of this turn; it presents us with a way of ap-
proaching our situation, both in general and in particular, that informs this attack
on fate and fatefulness. It is the operational ideology of this subversive and con-
structive practice. 222
This pragmatist conception is clearly quite different from the one mo-
tivating the eclectic and economic models. Although Unger acknowledges
the fact that the bottom line in the pragmatist manifesto is a negative one,
one that does the very important work of dispelling the veils of "false neces-
sity" and the "enslaving superstition of the mind," he argues that pragmatist
traditions that stop at this point fail to realize the true power inherent in the
philosophy.223 The problem is that pragmatism, as it has been traditionally
expounded, ends by dividing the power to clean house from the need for
revision. "[Pragmatism] provides us with no way to understand the circum-
stances or the capabilities that can make sense of such a reorientation....
The future of [pragmatism] ... lies in the intransigent radicalization of this
discontent." ' 4
In this view, radicalizing pragmatism largely persists in a shift from
saying that experimentation through fallible anti-skepticism is all we can do
to an emphasis on experimentation being a norm that we should strive to-
wards. Experimentation is therefore the prime mover in Unger's pragma-
tism, moved up from an instrumentality in the classic and neo-pragmatist
standards to a goal in this critical, radicalized edition: "The overriding cri-
terion by which to measure our success in approaching an experimentalist
ideal in politics is success in making change less dependent on crisis."22'
That is, historically the political, social, and economic arrangements associ-
ated with liberal democracies only become susceptible to change in the
event of some great calamity.
To render politics experimental is to dispense with the need for this ally. It is so to
organize the contest over the mastery and uses of governmental power-and in-
deed over all the institutionalized terms by which we can make claims on one an-
other-that the present arrangements and practices multiply opportunities for their
own revision. Change becomes internal.22 °
A fair point that might be raised here is one that asks what is so impor-
tant about "change," and pressures the framework that prioritizes subversion
so emphatically. What if we like the world in which we live? Why must
we wed ourselves to a posture that hopes to turn things inside out when we
might like things turned right side-up? The answer brings us back to Grey's
convert: is he excited by the possibilities he sees only in the re-making of
222. Id. at 7-8.
223. Id. at 31, 34.
224. Id. at 8-9.
225. Id. at 42.
226. Id. at 43.
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his own life story, or does he have reason to be excited by a re-imagined
society? Grey appears to be an example of the former, Unger the latter:
[the aim is] to arrange society and thought so that the difference between reproduc-
ing the present and experimenting with the future diminishes and fades. The result
is to embody the experimental impulse in a form of life and thought enabling us
more fully to reconcile engagement and transcendence. We then become both
more human and more godlike.227
Most pragmatists would agree with Unger that pragmatism is negative
in its overall orientation. But they would argue that his desire to merge this
deconstruction into a reconstructive practice might be a good thing, but it is
not pragmatism. Consequently, a question for Unger, to which he has a
response, is why he feels the need to call his program "pragmatism" at all,
since he admits that "[t]hese ideas have no exclusive relation to pragmatism
or indeed to any other accredited school of philosophical doctrine. 228
Unger's response is that he feels the classic pragmatists had emphasized,
though not originated, the themes that ultimately underscore the imperatives
of individual agency and deepened democracy, and that as pragmatism has
now claimed a position as "the philosophy of the age," there is utility in
commandeering the term.29 This commandeering is hoped to deliver prag-
matism from both the vernacular depository in which "pragmatism" oper-
ates as the working ideology of the United States, as well as an academic
view that has found consensus in the writings of Rorty and Putnam as
pragmatism's contemporary representatives.
Unger's philosophical pragmatism has a counterpart in legal analysis
which carries through on the legal realist premise that there are no natural,
neutral, or necessary legal forms, but ultimately prescribes a practice of
experimentalism. 2" The claim is that the legal profession is in the sway of a
dominant style of legal analysis which "helps arrest the development of the
dialectic between the rights of choice and the arrangements that make indi-
vidual and collective self-determination effective - a dialectic that is the
very genius of contemporary law. '23' This style, called "[r]ationalizing le-
gal analysis works by putting a good face - indeed the best possible face -
on as much of law as it can, and therefore also on the institutional arrange-
ments that take in law their detailed and distinctive form." '232 If a judge, for
example, were to distance herself from the rationalizing impulse, "intellec-
tual and political threats [become] intellectual and political opportunities
227. UNGER, THE SELF AWAKENED, supra note 210, at 43-44.
228. Id. at 26.
229. Id. at 1.
230. UNGER, supra note 12, at 23.
231. Id. at 39.
232. Id. at 40.
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[and the] materials for alternative constructions." '233 Unger offers a parable
to help make this point more concrete:
Suppose two societies in one of which the institutional arrangements are perceived
to be slightly more open to challenge and revision than in the other. In the margin-
ally more open society the jurists say: "Let us emphasize the diversity and the dis-
tinctiveness of the present arrangements, their accidental origins and surprising
variations, the better to criticize and change them, pillaging arrangements devised
for other purposes and recombining them in novel ways." The practice of such a
style of legal analysis over time will result in institutions that invite practical ex-
perimentalism, including experimentalism about the institutions themselves. Imag-
ine, by contrast, a society in which the institutions seem marginally less open to re-
vision. The jurists may say: "Let us make the best out of the situation by putting
the best plausible face upon these arrangements, emphasizing their proximity to a
rational and infinitely renewable plan. In the name of this rational reconstruction
we may hope to make things better, especially for those who most need help: the
people likely to be the victims of the social forces most directly in control of law-
making." The sustained practice of this method will, however, help close down
our opportunities for institutional experimentalism. It will do so both by turning
away from actual experiments and by denying us a way of thinking and talking,
collectively, about our institutional fate in the powerful and irreplaceable detail of
law. Such is the world rationalizing legal analysis has helped make.
23 4
b. The Experimental Method in Legal Reasoning
Partially inspired by Unger's work, there is a body of scholarship
which hopes to move away from the limits of rationalizing legal analysis
and "Legal Liberalism ' 235 towards the "new governance" of experimental
pragmatism. Sometimes going under the label of "new legal realism," 236
these scholars tend away from a preoccupation with courts and veer towards
administrative and regulatory reform and renewal. In the introduction to a
recent symposium on the new legal realism, the authors explain that their
approach involves
a pragmatist jurisprudence [which] may be to understand not only new governance
but to reimagine governance itself, a governance that is realist in the sense that it
does not enchant the state, but pragmatic in the sense that it resists simple abstrac-
tions, emphasizes dynamism, and invests our vision of democracy with real life
human relations.
237
The experimental method, as explained by Michael Dorf and Charles
Sabel, relies on two key premises. First is the notion that democratic gov-
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See Simon, supra note 202, at 127; ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986).
236. Is It Time For a New Legal Realism?, supra note 206, at 358.
237. Id. at 357-58.
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ernance, and not adjudication, is the key interest. 38 That is, experimental-
ists take a more holistic view of legal pragmatism and its scope, emphasiz-
ing the disability of courts to maintain their gate-keeping functions in what
is a crisis of governance facing the entire constitutional system in the United
States. For the promise of democracy to be realized, pragmatism must
reach well beyond the judiciary. Latent in this first assumption is the sec-
ond: there is a governance crisis that is badly in need of attention. By high-
lighting the rise of the fourth arm of government (the administrative state)
and criticisms of the degree to which the realities of democratic life actually
track foundational principles (e.g., separation of powers, federalism, and
individual rights),239 Dorf and Sabel make it clear that theirs is a reformist
agenda. On this view, American democracy is in big trouble, and it needs
fixing.
As for the method itself, it draws on an analogy to the private firm,
where innovations in the marketplace
suggest institutional devices for applying the basic principles of pragmatism to the
master problem of organizing decentralized, collaborative design and development
under conditions of volatility and diversity .... To determine what to make and
how, firms in this new economy must therefore resort to a collaborative explora-
tion of disruptive possibilities that has more in common with pragmatist ideas of
social inquiry than familiar ideas of market exchange.
240
Sabel and Doff apply these ideas to governmental action at the local
level, and argue that since problem-solving is inevitably at its most potent
and relevant at the local level, broadcasting the products of local govern-
ance initiatives through information-pooling techniques is essential. That is,
regional and federal institutions are necessary to insure the availability of
inter-local cross-linking, such that the fruits of deliberative call-and-
response might enable localities to learn from one another's successes and
failures. 24' The result of such an increase in deliberation and local initiative
would have two structural effects: the "privatization" on the one hand of
opening up governance strategy to the innovative style of a public market-
place, and on the other hand, the "re-politization" of our democratic institu-
tions through the introduction of "a novel form of deliberation based on the
diversity of practical activity, not the dispassionate homogeneity of those
insulated from everyday experience. 2 42 Together, it is argued, these effects
will restructure American democracy in a way that will at once track the
238. Dorf& Sabel, supra note 202, at 270.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 286.
241. Id. at 288.
242. Id. at 313-14.
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traditional interests in republican government and the evolving demands of
the administrative state.243
Despite the experimentalist emphasis on the legislative responsibility
to insure deliberative fora and local participation, courts still have a role to
play. One of the fundamental problems identified by Sabel and Doff is the
incapacity of courts to justifiably maneuver through political questions.
Where the courts defer to the legislature, such deference is often inappropri-
ate due to a lack of legislative intent regarding the relation of the means
employed and the ends that the statute seeks. At the same time, courts' in-
tervention and displacement of congressional will are typically assertions of
eclectic balancing techniques that betray little more than the courts' prefer-
ences for particular ends.244 The common problem here, according to Sabel
and Doff, is an indeterminate relation between means and ends-an inde-
terminacy that inevitably leads courts either to the extremes of deference or
to ad hoc value judgments.2 45  The way out of this dilemma is for the
court[s] to adopt, along with the other branches of government, a program
of democratic experimentalism.
In its holistic view of democratic governance, experimentalism posits
a role for the judiciary that avoids the indeterminacy dilemma by shifting
much of the work away from courts and into the hands of agencies and pri-
vate parties. From the environmental law context, Sabel and Doff illustrate
how this can work. In its adjudication of a dispute over the reasonableness
of the Reagan administration's "stationary source" interpretation, which
treated all emissions from a plant as a single source, the Supreme Court
deferred to the agency in light of the ambiguous language of the statute.246
An experimentalist court would not have been faced with this sort of
Hobson's choice-to defer or balance. Instead, various localities would be
empowered with the "bubble" approach, and after enough time had elapsed
and enough information gathered, parties could offer reasons as to why
bubble approaches were superior or not to the traditional reading of "sta-
tionary source. 247 Of course, this adjudicative style would be greatly as-
sisted by an experimentalist statute that allowed for such an approach, but
even in the absence of such legislation Sabel and Doff argue for experimen-
talist judging that takes as its baseline the need for parties to
define the range of alternatives to be considered in an evaluation of the appropri-
ateness of ends to means, further publicizing the variety of possibilities in the proc-
ess; and in deciding whether due consideration has been given to these alternatives,
243. Id.
244. Dorf& Sabel, supra note 202, at 390-95.
245. Id. at 389-95.
246. Id. at 395-96.
247. Id.
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the court refers to standards of care and attentiveness-the ability to learn and
learn to learn-that emerge from the practice of the relevant parties themselves.
248
In terms of its substance, experimentalist judging focuses on the delib-
erative responsibility of the parties, as well as care-taking of fundamental
legal norms. Procedurally, its focus is on participation and the degree to
which parties have referenced the best practices in other jurisdictions.249
In another article, Sabel and Simon illustrate the experimental ap-
proach with the case of "destabilization rights," a term borrowed from
Unger. Such rights "are claims to unsettle and open up public institutions
that have chronically failed to meet their obligations and that are substan-
tially insulated from the normal processes of political accountability." '251 A
destabilization right is not a typically Hohfeldian "right" in the sense that it
will be predicated on some duty by another party to make good on the
claimant's interest in destabilizing the given context. It is better understood
as bridging the court's analysis of the norm in question to the court's devel-
opment of a remedy. As Sabel and Simon explain,
Destabilization usefully describes both the remedy and the process by which the
meaning of the background substantive right is articulated in these cases. In the
new public law, the judge does not exercise discretion in each case to choose
among an infinite array of potential responses to the particular problem. Rather,
having found a violation of some broad norm-the right to an adequate education,
the right to access to justice-she imposes the single remedy that the liability phase
has shown to be appropriate: institutional destabilization.252
Sabel and Simon primarily discuss the concept as applied to public
law litigation, but they explain that the use of destabilization has been
common to private litigation. The common law's interest in securing free-
dom from competitive injury, for example, is a freedom predicated on a
court's predilection to disentrench monopolies and conspiracies. Antitrust
is therefore a kind of destabilization right. Similarly, in a public law con-
text, such as housing or education litigation, a court will justifiably enforce
a destabilization right under two conditions. The first is when liability has
been determined on the part of the government actor for failing to satisfy the
basic elements of its mandate. The second is an "important background
premise" which obtains when the court has found that the problem is sub-
stantially immune from conventional political mechanisms of correction. 3
After this "prima facie" case has been found, and the court moves into the
remedial phase, the "experimental tendency" "triggers a process of super-
248. Id. at 401.
249. Id. at 403.
250. Sabel & Simon, supra note 202, at 1055.
251. Id. at 1020.
252. Id. at 1056.
253. Id. at 1062.
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vised negotiation and deliberation among the parties and other stakeholders.
The characteristic result of this process is a regime of rolling or provisional
rules that are periodically revised in light of transparent evaluations of their
implementation."254
This statement captures the basic elements of the experimentalism Sa-
bel and Simon have detected in their wide-ranging research on public law
litigation: once liability has been determined, (1) the parties engage in a
deliberative process in which their interests, which may not have been clear
before litigation, have likely been disaggregated after the liability determi-
nation; (2) a regime of rolling rules is established which is constantly sub-
ject to revision as new information comes to light; and (3) the process is
cast in explicitly transparent terms. Consequently, the judicial "remedy" is
ambiguous in the traditional sense, and is best understood as one of institu-
tional destabilization. The actual goals of the remedy are unknown. In
pragmatic fashion, they will be manufactured by the involved parties as they
go through the motions of deliberation, study, and renewed contest.
Sabel and Simon discuss many of the common criticisms of public law
litigation, as well as Supreme Court decisions hostile to trial court involve-
ment in what appears to be the never-ending saga of intractable political
problems. According to the authors, however, these criticisms misappre-
hend the benefits of a judicial tendency towards experimentalism through
destabilization rights. Whereas decisions in housing cases have often been
criticized for their abuse of judicial discretion and separation of powers im-
plications, or on the basis that the decisions simply do not effect any mean-
ingful solutions,
[e]xperimentalist intervention is both more consistent with judicial practice in
common law cases and more compatible with electoral mechanisms of democratic
accountability than most accounts of public law litigation recognize. Experimen-
talist remedies expose public institutions to pressures of disciplined comparison
that resemble the market pressures enforced by common law norms. At the same
time, the transparency they induce facilitates related forms of democratic interven-
tion, including electoral ones. The features of experimentalist intervention that re-
spond to concerns about both efficacy and legitimacy are captured by the idea of
destabilization rights. In stigmatizing the status quo, the court's intervention opens
the defendant institution up to participation of previously marginalized stake-
holders and clears the way for the redefinition of relations among more established
ones. Counterintuitively, destabilization through new public law creates opportu-
nities for collaborative learning and democratic accountability that the more certain
world of pluralist bargaining under the aegis of courts or legislatures often pre-
cludes.
2 55
In sum, experimental pragmatism is like eclectic pragmatism and
unlike economic pragmatism in that there does not appear to be a static nor-
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1100-01.
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mative foundation that steers pragmatic decision-making. Where eclectics
pick and choose as the situation demands, experimentalists maintain a more
rigorous orientation. There is, after all, a program here: (1) experiment lo-
cally; (2) adopt provisional goals; (3) pool information across jurisdictions;
(4) repeat. 256 Experimentalism therefore places a premium on locality, re-
form, and multi-jurisdictional dialectics. On the other hand, experimental-
ists share with economic pragmatists an emphasis on the public utility of
pragmatic decision-making, taking the fruits of the pragmatist method from
the private and pushing it into the public.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A. Pragmatism? What Pragmatism?
The first aim in this Article was to intervene in what appears to be a
growing amount of confusion over the nature of pragmatism in its relation
to law. This intervention suggested that, at the very least, one can discern
between an everyday pragmatism in the American vernacular, the philoso-
phical pragmatism of the classic writers, and pragmatism as manifested in
the realm of legal decision. The discussion began by looking to non-
pragmatist fields that suggest entryways into legal pragmatism but which
stop short, for various reasons, of constituting legal pragmatism itself. Le-
gal pragmatism, it was argued, shares with consequentialism a focus on
function and an interest in consequences but maintains an anti-
foundationalist strategy meant to steer clear of the moral criteria on the na-
ture of the "good." Further, legal pragmatism, at least in its eclectic and
economic variations, identifies itself as strictly separate from the philosophy
of the classical style, casting notions of truth and knowledge (so important
to the philosophers) as irrelevant to the practical work of legal reasoning.
Lastly, legal pragmatism was distinguished from legal realism in accord
with the subversive concept of the political at work among the realists. Le-
gal pragmatists, as has been argued, sing in a number of political registers,
from the center-right work of Farber and Posner to the center-left of Grey,
Sabel, and Simon, to the far left of Unger. Further, the three varieties of
legal pragmatism are all indigenous to the "post-social" aspects of contem-
porary legal analysis, whereas legal realism is not. For eclectics, they are
post-social in their acceptance of balancing techniques. For economists,
they are post-social in their subscription to a sectarian legal methodology.
For experimentalists, they are post-social in their refutation of the main-
stream liberalism immanent in the language of individual rights.
256. See supra Part II.
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This diversity within the ranks of the legal pragmatists appears to be
lost on many legal scholars. Look at the exemplary work of no less an ex-
pert than Ronald Dworkin. In his recent Justice in Robes,257 Dworkin sur-
veys a few of the legal theories rivaling his own, and his first target is "legal
pragmatism." '258 Although Dworkin does say that "[t]his theory has taken
different forms and attracted different names," he nonetheless seems to con-
flate these various forms with the one affiliated with his long-time nemesis,
Richard Posner."9 Dworkin's understanding is that pragmatism is a theory
of adjudication that "should make whatever decision is best for the commu-
nity's future with no regard to past practice as such.""26 To do any more
than this, Dworkin suggests, would plunge the pragmatist into the founda-
tionalism of consequentialism.26 Although Dworkin is definitely onto
something here, he ultimately shows a less than complete understanding of
Posner's less than complicated economic pragmatism. Dworkin argues that
Posner's pragmatism "comes to nothing, that it is empty," because Posner
fails to identify the criteria for determining "best consequences.""26
Dworkin then suggests that Posner is in a bind, since if he were to provide
criteria, he would head into consequentialism, but if he does not, the theory
is meaningless.263
Although I largely agree with Dworkin's conclusions, the argument is
nonetheless confused. First, Posner does offer criteria, repeatedly, and they
consist in the rules of economics. Second, Dworkin's critique is best lev-
eled at a group he does not even witness-those eclectic pragmatists who
really do adopt a functional, practical, and ad-hoc perspective without
adopting a set of explicit decisionist criteria. In their apolitical posture, the
eclectics are the ones worshipping at the altar of reasonableness and his-
toricity-judges who on the whole "obey the legislature and keep faith with
past judicial decisions.""264 Third, Dworkin's insistence on a consequential-
ist framework of means and ends misconstrues the entire pragmatist enter-
prise that sets itself against just such a posture. Fourth, Dworkin's critique
of Rorty and Fish seems to be taken as an attack on a radical arm of legal
pragmatism, and yet, neither of these philosophers have put together legal
accounts like those found in the work of the experimentalists. Overall,
Dworkin seems to have the right idea that there is something deeply trou-
bling about legal pragmatism, but he fails not only in properly characteriz-
257. RONALD DwoRKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES (2006).
258. Id. at21.
259. Id. Although Dworkin says that there are more radical variants, he does not list
any. Id. at 23.
260. Id. at 21.
261. Id.
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ing his primary target in Posner but also in characterizing the general ter-
rain.
B. Pragmatism and Formalism, Together Again, and Again...
A second aim in this Article took as a background premise the work of
Duncan Kennedy on the evolution of American legal consciousness, and in
particular the argument that the contemporary period is characterized by an
undigested mess of contradictory legal maneuvers left over from the clash
between Classical Legal Thought and the "social" sensibility that came into
high fashion after the New Deal. The result is what Kennedy calls a con-
flicting considerations approach, where legal decision-making pushes back
and forth between the policy analysis of consequentialist balancing and the
deductive work of neo-formalism.265 I have suggested that legal pragma-
tism, in its eclectic form, captures a good deal of this posture. Not only
does the method of the eclectic track the principal work of the policy ana-
lyst, but it also accounts for the decision to shift back and forth between
consequentialist legal reasoning and formalism, as the situation demands.266
Eclectic pragmatism thus stands for more than a simple synonym for policy
balancing; it also incorporates what Posner has called formalist pockets267-
the availability to the pragmatist judge to use the tools of Classical Legal
Thought when he feels the consequences of doing so are justified. The fact
that such a move will be made in bad faith is, for Posner, of no moment.
Eclectic pragmatism and the policy balancing that it entails, however,
do not only represent a method which at times makes a neo-formalist ap-
proach available. In some sense, eclectic pragmatism seems to go a step
further, actually producing the formalism that philosophical pragmatism had
meant to eradicate. By way of an example, imagine again the human rights
advocate discussed in the context of Sen's distinction between sympathies
and commitments.268 In large measure, this advocate believes in a concept
of individual autonomy from which might be deduced a scheme of rights
and responsibilities. This belief spurs the advocate on to seek the protec-
tion, through international and domestic legal instruments, of individual
rights because these are the rights that liberal internationalism can be under-
265. Kennedy, supra note 91, at 22-23.
266. That is, the decision-maker that tends to balance, but also uses formalist means
because he believes that sometimes it is the right thing to do, is not an eclectic in the style
that I have described. Rather, this decision-maker has attached some foundational apparatus,
conveniently providing him with clues as to when to balance and when to deduce. The
eclectic pragmatist, in contrast, always acts in bad faith-he knows that legal "answers,"
whether they are produced through balancing or deduction, are always an artifact of strategic
action, and are never the choice because they are somehow "right."
267. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 124, at 59-60.
268. See supra Subsection III.B.2.c.
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stood to demand. Concretely, this can mean an interest in arguing for free-
dom from torture in Guantanamo to freedom of expression in China to free-
dom of participation in Iraq. Whatever specific right might be deduced
from the abstract liberal principle of individual autonomy, however, it is
easy enough to recognize in human rights discourse the conceptual language
immanent in the work of Classical Legal Thought. The human rights advo-
cate, as a result, can be understood as a manifestation of a type of neo-
formalism. But the human rights advocate will surely respond from a post-
CLT experience familiar with the critique of deduction and abstract form.
The work of human rights, the advocate will explain, is pragmatic, conse-
quentialist, savvy, and constantly open to the give-and-take balancing of the
contemporary period. Perhaps the dream of the human rights warrior re-
mains a formalist one, but the actual work is stamped with the imprimatur
of pragmatic activism.
What, then, lies in this strange relationship between pragmatic means
and formalist ends? Is it possible that the availability of pragmatist lan-
guage actually enables the survivability of the formalist interest in an ab-
stracted concept of individual autonomy? After all, what would happen to
such an interest if eclectic pragmatism were to vanish? It is clear enough
that Classical Legal Thought was hugely discredited by the legal realist
movement and the developments thereafter, and yet, neo-formalist strategies
clearly remain alive and well in contemporary legal analysis. If the lan-
guage of eclecticism and its attendant power to inoculate against the realist
critique suddenly became unavailable to the rights advocate, one of two
things would likely come about. The first would be a full-scale resurgence
of Classical Legal Thought, no longer embarrassed by legal realism, prag-
matism, deconstructionism, or any of the other movements in the twentieth
century that exposed the assumptions necessary for a workable-and politi-
cal-system of thought. The other option, more amenable to the human
rights advocate nervous about a strong neo-formalist claim, would be to
move away from eclectic pragmatism and towards experimentalism, or any
other non-pragmatist movement that identified itself in truly anti-
foundational terms. As it stands, however, eclectic pragmatism remains
open to the human rights advocate, and as long as he is able to shield him-
self against the social critique of deduction and abstraction by reference to
his pragmatism, the formalist dream will continue.
C. Pragmatism: What's the Use?
A third aim of the Article, separate from hinting at the alliance of a
formalist/pragmatist strategy, has been to suggest that despite the preva-
lence and diversity of legal pragmatism, it seems to have a habit of claiming
to spell out how judges decide cases without really spelling out how judges
decide cases. This false promise shines at its brightest in the work of the
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eclectics, but we see it with the economic and experimentalist pragmatists
as well. Little ink need be spilled on why the eclectics fail to realize the
potential of the pragmatist promise for renewal, revitalization, and power.
After all, Grey acknowledges that a free-standing legal pragmatism is banal
in its quest for reasonable decisions in context.269 Farber, despite his zeal, is
just as likely to argue against anything exciting or dynamic about his prag-
matist sensibility. The advantage in this view lies precisely in the systemic
stability and historical continuity legal pragmatism is meant to uphold. And
yet, despite these admissions, the eclectic pragmatist stills falls short, for the
very same reasons that everyday pragmatism is so disappointing. In its apo-
litical posture, the eclectic can never account for whatever counts as reason-
able other than decisions that happen to shore up the status quo of a con-
temporary political/social/economic/legal alliance. And if all the eclectic
can ever do is make decisions that stabilize the status quo, well, what use is
that? In the end, the so-called functionalism of the approach even begins to
run out: if the point of decision inevitably turns on a matter of what will
make the system run consistently with the power structure of the moment, a
very potent formalism seems to be at work. Indeed, it is in the very articula-
tion of the apolitical stance-that stance favored in the name of reason and
stability-which lays a very particular politics. The upshot is, despite admi-
rable attempts at the contrary, that apolitical attitudes simply don't exist. As
Carl Schmidt argued in the last line of his Concept of the Political, liberal-
ism attempts the very same maneuver that I have attributed to the eclectic in
the banishing of politics from juridical discourse.27° With reference to the
inevitable distinction between members of a political community and non-
members, liberalism hopes to confine the political when it separates the
economic and the social from the state: "But this allegedly nonpolitical and
apparently even antipolitical system serves existing or newly emerging
friend-and-enemy groupings and cannot escape the logic of the political." '71
With such a dire view of the eclectic, is it the case that experimental
pragmatism makes good on the pragmatist promise where others have
failed? In this Article, I have made the argument that where the eclectics
observe the philosophy/politics distinction, experimentalists are eager to
take Dewey and Unger where few pragmatists have gone before. That is,
they seek to elaborate a pragmatist point of decision that makes good on the
269. See supra Subsection III.B.2.
270. CARL ScHMITr, CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 77 (1976).
271. Id. at 79. Max Weber sounds a similar theme:
When we say that a question is 'political,' . . . or that a decision has been made on
'political' grounds, we always mean the same thing. This is that the interests in-
volved in the distribution or preservation of power, or a shift in power, play a deci-
sive role in resolving that question, or in influencing that decision or defining the
sphere of activity of the official concerned.
MAX WEBER, THE VOCATION LECTURES 33 (2004).
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means/ends and fact/value dualisms by making destabilization, transforma-
tion, and experimentalism the key criteria. With this set of tools, it seems in
some ways unfair to criticize experimental pragmatism as a mode of reason-
ing on the basis of particular projects being carried out in its name. After
all, such projects are only experiments.
Is it possible, then, to criticize experimental pragmatism from the
point of view of the normative consequentialist-a form of decision-making
totally anathema to the pragmatist? To do so would be to imagine the deci-
sion-making procedure such that the right act for the experimental judge
will be the act with the most "experimental" consequences.272 But surely
this cannot be right, for if it was, such a judge would feel compelled to re-
volt in toto against the legal system. That would, after all, be quite destab-
lilizing. And yet, if such a conclusion is out of bounds for the experimental-
ist judge, then a problem begins to creep in. If particular judicial acts would
be so experimental that they would destroy the legal system, surely the ex-
perimental judge will come to a point when he says "Ok, enough's enough.
This is just crazy." But when is that? It's hard to see an answer here, but
part of the problem, the experimentalist might respond, "is that this formal
way of looking at the decision is that it is assuming a foundation from
which the experimentation will inevitably draw, and if anything, the prag-
matist does not do that. To worry about when experimentalism might take
us too far is a worry rooted in a rejection of the experimental idea that the
ends are actually in the means, and if we end up with a system we don't
like, we can always keep re-making it. Indeed, we must always remake it,
since it is impossible to ever know a great and final truth." This normative
criticism of the experimental pragmatist, therefore, may end up being little
more than a criticism of pragmatist philosophy in general, and if it is, so be
it.
D. Against the Cold and the Clammy
The philosopher Soren Kierkegaard, one of the grandfathers of what
later became known as Existentialism, once wrote that there is a great para-
dox at the heart of human existence.273 This paradox consisted of a double
272.
It has also been objected that the creative act itself is being declared the highest
trading value. A pragmatist legal theory would indeed be too narrowly cast as long
as it took as its theme only the production of new solutions to problems and not
also the new criteria for evaluating them.
Siegfried Schieder, Pragmatism as a Path towards a Discursive and Open Theory of Interna-
tional Law, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 663, 689 (2000).
273. SOREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING: REPETITION (Howard V. Hong &
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understanding, the results of which were inescapably "absurd. 274 On the
one hand, Kierkegaard explained, human beings live in a world that con-
stantly demands the elaboration and purification of Reason-that tool which
distinguishes us from the rest of the animal kingdom.275 At the same time,
however, that same world to which humans belong chides us at every step
for having been seduced by our beliefs in Reason's dominion. This double
understanding, and the paradox that lies within it, thus pushes the human
mind to reason its way through the world while cognizant of the fact that
reason is itself incapable of making sense of our predicament. In much of
Kierkegaard's work he dealt with the question of faith that ultimately at-
tends the "absurd": the question of how one decides in the face of this dou-
ble-conundrum.276 One possible strategy, with which Kierkegaard had little
patience, was something like pragmatism. To judge decisions on the basis
of their consequences, from the happily post-hoc position, was to misunder-
stand the gripping fact of decision we know when we come face-to-face
with the absurd. Kierkegaard writes:
If occasionally there is any response at all these days with regard to the paradox, it
is likely to be: One judges it by the result. Aware that he is a paradox who cannot
be understood, a hero who has become a ... [offense] to his age will shout confi-
dently to his contemporaries: The result will indeed prove that I was justified. This
cry is rarely heard in our age, inasmuch as it does not produce heroes-this is its
defect-and it likewise has the advantage that it produces few caricatures. When
in our age we hear these words: It will be judged by the result-then we know at
once with whom we have the honor of speaking .... Their life task is to judge the
great men, judge them according to the result .... Anyone with even a smattering
. .. [of nobility of nature] never becomes an utterly cold and clammy worm, and
when he approaches greatness, he is never devoid of the thought that since the
creation of the world it has been customary for the result to come last and that if
one is truly going to learn something from greatness one must be particularly
aware of the beginning. If the one who is to act wants to judge himself by the re-
sult, he will never begin. Although the result may give joy to the entire world, it
cannot help the hero, for he would not know the result until the whole thing was
over, and he would not become a hero by that but by making a beginning.
277
It may seem strange to end an article which has largely had as its pur-
pose to map the state of legal pragmatism with an existential critique of
consequentialist decision-making. And yet, it is interesting to note that the
rarity of the pragmatist move in Kierkegaard's time has dramatically trans-
formed in the present day, where the eclecticism of everyday pragmatism
has, at least in the United States, become the sign of the times. For Kierke-
gaard, one might assume, this fact might suggest that we live in the age of
the cold and the clammy-the age in which we avoid the absurd by way of
274. Id. at 46.
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having our cake and eating it, too-by having our formalism masquerade as
the Knight of Pragmatism. Perhaps this is good, possibly not. Whatever the
case may be, the fear and trembling that Kierkegaard associated with a mo-
ment of decision in the face of the absurd is not really a long way off from a
philosophical pragmatism pregnant with the seeds of an explosive experi-
mentalism. Eclectic pragmatism misunderstands this fear and excitement,
and in so doing, has misunderstood its history, and most importantly, what
it might have become.

